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Case No. 20090894-SC 
INTHE 
UTAH SUPREME COURT 
TROVON DONTA ROSS, 
Petitioner / Appellant, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent/Appellee. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Petitioner, Trovon Donta Ross, appeals the denial of his petition for relief 
under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act (PCRA) challenging his conviction for 
aggravated murder, a capital felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-202. 
This Court has jurisdiction under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-3-102(3)(j) (West 2009). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
This Court affirmed Ross's conviction in an appeal where new counsel 
represented him. Ross then sought post-conviction relief on claims that (1) his 
trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise an extreme emotional distress 
defense and (2) his appellate counsel was ineffective for not raising this claim of 
trial counsel ineffectiveness. The State moved for summary judgment on both 
claims, arguing that the first claim was procedurally barred and that the second 
failed as a matter of law. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1. Did the post-conviction court correctly deny as procedurally barred 
Ross's claim of trial counsel ineffectiveness because he could have raised it on 
appeal? 
2. Did the post-conviction court correctly conclude that Ross's claim of 
appellate counsel ineffectiveness failed as a matter of law? 
Standard of review for issues 1 and 2. This Court will "'review an appeal 
from an order dismissing or denying a petition for post-conviction relief for 
correctness without deference to the lower court's conclusions of law.'" Gardner 
v. State, 2010 UT 46, f 55, 234 P.3d 1115 (quoting Taylor v. State, 2007 UT 12, f 13, 
156 P.3d 739). Likewise, this Court will "'review a district court's decision to 
grant summary judgment for correctness.'" Allen v. Moyer, 2011 UT 44, % 5, 687 
Utah Adv. Rep. 5 (quoting City of Grantsville v. Redevelopment Agency, 2010 UT 38, 
^8,233P.3d461). 
3. Did the post-conviction court abuse its discretion in denying Ross's 
motion for appointment of pro bono counsel under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-9-
109? 
Standard of review. This Court reviews the denial of a motion to appoint 
counsel under the PCRA for an abuse of discretion. See Huichings v. State, 2003 
UT 52, If 20, 84 P.3d 1150 (recognizing that section 78-35a-109-the prior version 
2 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of section 78B-9-109—leaves the appointment of counsel "to the court's 
discretion"). 
ST ATUTES AND RULES 
The following statutes and rules, reproduced in Addendum A, are relevant 
to this appeal: 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-9-106 (WestSupp. 2011); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-9-109 (West 2009); 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56; 
UtahR.Civ.P.65C. 
CASE AND FACT STATEMENT 
The crimes 
Early on a June morning in 2003, Ross knocked on the front door of the 
home of his ex-girlfriend, Annie Christensen. TR.433:40-41.1 Ross carried a High 
Point .380 semi-automatic pistol hidden in his waistband. TR.433:44, 61. The 
gun had a full ammunition clip and a round in the chamber. TR.433:167-69. 
Christensen answered the door and let Ross in. TR.433:41. He waited in the 
front room while she went back to her bedroom and returned with James May, 
her current boyfriend. TR.433:41, 55-56. 
Ross asked Christensen to tell May when she and Ross last had sex. 
TR.433:44, 59. He also told Christensen to tell May that she hated her father. 
1
 "TR" indicates the underlying criminal case record. "PCR" indicates the 
post-conviction case record. 
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TR.433:44, 59. When Christensen did not respond, Ross pulled out his gun and 
renewed his requests. TR.433:44, 61. Christensen still refused to answer and 
begged Ross to leave. TR.433:45, 60. 
Ross turned to May and stated, "I can't let her hurt you like she hurt me." 
TR.433:46, 60-61. Ross pointed his gun at Christensen, grabbed her arm, and 
pushed her past May towards the bedroom. TR.433:46, 62. 
May believed that his best hope to save himself and Christensen was to go 
for help. TR.433:47. As he went into the garage and got into his car he heard a 
gunshot. TR.433:47. He heard two more shots as he frantically tried to start his 
car. TR.433:47, 65. Looking up, May saw Ross in the doorway leading into the 
garage. TR. 433:48, 65. 
Unable to start his car, May threw his keys, jumped out, and ran. 
TR.433:48, 65. Ross emptied his gun at May, firing six shots. TR.433:48, 65,167-
69. The second shot passed through May's right arm and into his chest, lodging 
just under the skin in front of his ribs. TR.433:48; 437:34. Bleeding profusely, 
May continued running, hopping fences and knocking on neighbors' doors in 
search of help. TR.433:48-49. He finally ended up in the middle of the street 
where he flagged down a driver who called the police. TR.433:50. When the 
police arrived minutes later, May told them that Christensen had been shot and 
directed them to her house. TR.433:50, 89-90, 111. 
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After killing Christensen and attempting to kill May, Ross called 
Christensen's father, Steven Christensen. TR.433:158. Ross told Steven, "I just 
shot and killed your daughter, Annie, and I'm on my way to your home to finish 
the job/' TR.433:158. 
Neighbors who heard the gunshots saw a white van speeding away from 
Christensen's home and called 911 to report the shots and the van's description. 
TR.433:73-74, 76, 80, 83-85. Several police officers on route to Christensen's home 
passed the van, turned around, and activated their lights and sirens. TR.433:120-
21,133-34. The van sped up and the officers chased it for several miles at speeds 
of up to eighty miles an hour. TR.433:124-27,134-36. 
During the chase, Ross threw his gun out the window. TR.433:122. A 
passing motorist recovered it and turned it over to police. TR.433:142-43, 146. 
Ross also called his boss, Richard Luna, during the chase. TR.437:22). He left the 
following message on Luna's voicemail: "I just shot Annie, and I'm sorry man. I 
just shot her and I've got cops on my butt right now. (inaudible) I'm going to kill 
myself. I'm sorry, Richard. I love you man. Bye." TR.423:1; 437:22, 25; State's 
Ex. 58. The police eventually cornered Ross in a residential cul-de-sac and, after 
a brief foot-chase, arrested him. TR.433:128-30,137-38. 
The medical examiner concluded that Ross first shot Christensen in the 
back of the head, causing her to collapse. TR.437:51-52. After she fell to the floor, 
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Ross shot her twice more at point blank range, once in the neck and once in the 
abdomen. TR.437:51-52, 70-71. 
Police recovered nine spent bullet casings and five expended bullets. 
TR.433:176, 189, 195; 437:6-8, 38, 46. Ballistics testing determined that all of the 
spent casings and bullets were fired from Ross's gun. TR.437:66-67. 
The criminal case 
The State charged Ross with aggravated murder, attempted aggravated 
murder, and failure to obey an officer's signal to stop. TR.1-3. Ross conceded 
that he had murdered Christensen and attempted to murder May; he argued 
only that the jury should not convict him of aggravated murder because the two 
acts were separate criminal episodes. TR.434:13-14. Stephen R. McCaughey, and \ 
William Albright represented Ross at trial. TR.433:!; 434:1. 
After the jury retired to deliberate, McCaughey asked to make a record 
regarding trial strategy. TR.434:20 (copies of the relevant transcript pages are 
included in Addendum B). With Ross present, McCaughey explained that he did 
i 
not raise an extreme emotional distress defense "because of evidentiary problems 
as are known to Mr. Ross and myself and as a matter of trial strategy. 
TR.434:20-21. McCaughey further explained that if a penalty phase were 
necessary, Ross would testify and that testimony would show "the 
reasonableness of that strategy/' TR.434:21. < 
6 
i 
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McCaughey explained that he and Ross had discussed this strategy "a lot, 
on numerous occasions/' TR.434:21. Ross confirmed that he had discussed the 
strategy with his counsel and that he agreed with it. TR.21-22. 
A jury convicted Ross of aggravated murder and all other charges. 
TR.341-43;434:22. Ross then agreed to waive his right to a jury in the penalty 
phase, in exchange for the State's recommendation that he be sentenced to life 
without parole on the aggravated murder conviction. TR.435:2,9. The trial court 
agreed and sentenced Ross to concurrent prison terms of life without parole, five 
years to life, and zero to five years. TR.369-72; 435:21-22. 
The direct appeal 
Ms. Elizabeth Hunt represented Ross on direct appeal. TR.399, 419, 459; 
State v. Ross, 2007. UT 89, 174 P.3d 628 (a copy of this opinion is included in 
addendum C). Ross claimed on appeal that: (1) Utah's death penalty statute was 
unconstitutionally vague; (2) his aggravated murder and attempted aggravated 
murder convictions should merge; (3) the impaneling of an anonymous jury 
prejudiced him; and (4) the prosecutor committed misconduct. Ross, 2007 UT 89, 
f 18. This Court rejected Ross's first, third, and fourth claims, but agreed that his 
attempted aggravated murder conviction should merge with his aggravated 
murder conviction. Id. f f^ 59, 67. This Court therefore affirmed the conviction 
7 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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for aggravated murder and vacated the conviction for attempted aggravated 
murder. Id. 
The post-conviction case 
Ross, acting pro se, filed a timely petition for relief under the PCRA raising 
fifteen claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness. PCR.5-35, 68-71. Ross also filed a 
motion for the appointment of pro bono counsel. PCR.1-2. The post-conviction 
court reviewed the petition and found it to be deficient because it did not allege a 
sufficient factual basis to support the ineffective assistance claims and Ross 
included no supporting memorandum. PCR.70. Pursuant to rule 65C(g)(3) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the post-conviction court returned the petition 
to Ross and granted him leave to file an amended petition.2 PCR.70. \ 
Ross subsequently filed a fifty-two-page memorandum supporting his 
petition and asked the post-conviction court to reconsider his petition in light of 
the memorandum. PCR. 73-124, 243. The memorandum included further detail 
regarding Ross's claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness. PCR.85-122. Ross also 
added a claim that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue on 
appeal that trial counsel wras ineffective for foregoing an extreme emotional 
distress defense. PCR.122. Ross also explained his relationship with 
2
 Rule 65C was amended in January 2010 and this subsection was 
redesignated as 65C(h)(3). Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(h)(3) (2011). < 
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Christensen. PCR.74-80. Among other things, he acknowledged that he knew 
that Christensen was dating other men, including May. PCR. 75-77. He also 
acknowledged that "both were sexually active with other partners/7 PCR.78. 
Ross also filed a second motion for appointment of pro bono counsel. PCR.263. 
The post-conviction court reviewed the petition and supporting 
memorandum for frivolousness pursuant to rule 65C(g) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. PCR.255. The post-conviction court dismissed as frivolous all 
of Ross's claims with the exception of his "claims of ineffective assistance of trial 
and appellate counsel pertaining to the failure of counsel to raise the affirmative 
defense" of extreme emotional distress. PCR.255. The court ordered the State to 
respond to these two remaining claims. PCR.257. The post-conviction court 
denied Ross's motions for appointment of pro bono counsel as premature. 
PCR.265-66 (a copy of this order is included in Addendum F).3 
The State responded to the petition by moving for summary judgment on 
both of Ross's claims. PCR.287-305. Ross opposed the State's motion. PCR.335-
41. He also filed a motion for default judgment, arguing that the State's response 
was untimely filed. PCR.344-46. He never renewed his motion to appoint 
counsel. 
3
 The record contains two consecutive pages numbered R.265. 
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The post-conviction court granted the State's summary judgment motion 
and denied Ross's motion for a default judgment. PCR.353-66 (a copy of the 
post-conviction court's order is attached as Addendum D). Ross timely appeals. 
PCR.369. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. The post-conviction court correctly denied as procedurally barred 
Ross's claiixi that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to assert an extreme 
emotional distress defense. The PCRA bars a petitioner from obtaining relief on 
any claim that he could have raised on direct appeal. Ross could have raised this 
claim in his direct appeal because he was represented by new counsel and had 
the means to assure an adequate record for appellate review. In fact, Ross admits 
that he could have raised this claim on direct appeal. Therefore, the post-
conviction court correctly denied the claim as procedurally barred. 
II. The post-conviction court correctly concluded that Ross's claim that 
appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise his claim of trial counsel 
ineffectiveness failed as a matter of law. Ross did not proffer evidence that, if 
proven, would have demonstrated that the claim was obvious from the record 
and would have likely succeeded on appeal. Ross failed to show that the claim 
was obvious from the record because the record contained trial counsels' 
explanation that, although they recognized the evidence could support an 
10 
i 
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extreme emotional distress defense, they made a strategic decision not to raise 
the defense based on extra-record facts known only to counsel and Ross. This 
was not a case where counsel overlooked an obvious defense. 
Ross also failed to show that the claim likely would have succeeded on 
appeal. Ross first argues that he met this standard because, although counsel 
explained that they strategically chose not to raise the defense, they never fully 
explained their reasoning. Because, according to Ross, the record did not 
establish that trial counsels' strategic decision actually was reasonable, and 
because the evidence would have supported the defense, Ross argues that the 
post-conviction court erroneously concluded that an appellate claim of trial 
counsel ineffectiveness would not have likely succeeded. However, this 
argument ignores the fact that Ross bore the burden of demonstrating 
ineffectiveness. It also ignores the fact that his trial counsels' decision was 
presumptively reasonable. 
To show that his appellate counsel could have likely succeeded on this 
claim, Ross bore the burden of proffering evidence that would show how 
appellate counsel could have overcome the strong presumption that his trial 
counsel performed effectively. Therefore, Ross had to allege the reasons that his 
trial counsel chose not to raise the defense even though the evidence supported 
11 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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it, and then explain why those reasons were inadequate. Because he did not, his 
claim failed as a matter of law. 
Alternatively, Ross argues that he overcame the presumption that his 
counsels' decision to forego the defense was reasonable because the evidence in 
his case would have supported the defense. But the fact that the record evidence 
supported his defense was insufficient to rebut the presumption of 
reasonableness where counsel recognized that the record evidence would have 
supported the defense, yet still made a strategic decision not to raise it because of 
evidentiary problems known only to counsel and Ross. Because Ross never 
alleged why his counsels' strategy was unreasonable, the post-conviction court 
correctly denied his claim. 
III. The post-conviction court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
Ross's motions for appointment of pro bono counsel as premature. Ross filed the 
motions before the State had responded to his claims. The post-conviction court 
had dismissed as frivolous all but two of Ross's claims. The true complexity of 
those remaining claims and the need for an evidentiary hearing was not clear 
where the State had not yet responded. Moreover, Ross's filings to that point 
demonstrated his ability to proceed on his own. Therefore, the post-conviction 
court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motions as premature. 
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Ross did not renew his motion for counsel after receiving the State's 
motion for summary judgment although the post-conviction court had expressly 
granted him leave to do so. Instead, he filed a pro se response. Therefore, Ross 
tacitly conceded that he did not need counsel's assistance to respond to the 
State's motion. 
ARGUMENT 
I. ROSS'S CLAIM OF TRIAL COUNSEL INEFFECTIVENESS IS 
PROCEDURALLY BARRED 
Ross sought post-conviction relief on the ground that his trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to raise an extreme emotional distress defense. PCR.8, 85-
102. The State responded that it was entitled to summary judgment on this claim 
because the claim was procedurally barred where Ross could have raised it on 
direct appeal. PCR.301-02. The post-conviction court agreed. PCR.360-62 (Add. 
D). 
Ross appears to argue that the post-conviction court erroneously found his 
claim to be procedurally barred. Br. Aplt. at 12-14. He contends that "the district 
court erroneously ruled that Mr. Ross was precluded from raising ineffective 
assistance of counsel under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act/' Br. Aplt. at 12 
(holding and capitalization omitted). However, Ross never explains exactly how 
the post-conviction court erred in denying his claim of trial counsel 
ineffectiveness as procedurally barred. Br. Aplt. at 12-14. Rather, he admits that 
13 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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"[b]ecause [he] was represented by different counsel on direct appeal, the issues 
could have been raised on direct appeal." Id. at 13. Ross's admission defeats any 
assertion that the post-conviction court erroneously found this claim to be 
procedurally barred. 
A petitioner cannot obtain post-conviction relief on a claim that he could 
have raised on direct appeal because '"[a] petition for post-conviction relief 'is 
not a substitute for appellate review/" Kell v. State, 2008 UT 62, f 13,194 P.3d 
913 (quoting Taylor v. State, 2007 UT 12, % 14, 156 P.3d 739). The PCRA bars a 
petitioner from proceeding on "any ground that . . . could have been but was not 
raised at trial or on appeal." UTAH CODE ANN. § 76B-9-106(l)(c) (West Supp. 
2011).* 
A defendant can raise in his direct appeal a claim of trial counsel 
ineffectiveness when (1) he is represented on appeal by new counsel, and (2) the 
appellate record is adequate. See State v. Liiherland, 2000 UT 76, % 12-17,12 P.3d 
92. The post-conviction court correctly found that both requirements were 
satisfied in Ross's case. First, Ross's appellate counsel, Ms. Elizabeth Hunt, did 
not represent Ross at trial. TR.433:1. Second, rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, allowed Ross to ensure that the appellate record would be adequate 
4
 Although this section was amended in 2010, the amendments do not 
change the substance of the relevant provision; therefore, the State cites to the 
current version of the statute. 
14 
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to adjudicate his claim. See Litherland, 2000 UT 76 at f 14; Utah R. App. P. 23B(a) 
(" A party to an appeal in a criminal case may move the court to remand the case 
to the trial court for entry of findings of fact, necessary for the appellate court's 
determination of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel"). 
Ross does not explain why he could not have raised on direct appeal his 
claim of trial counsel ineffectiveness. Rather, he admits that he could have done 
so. Br. Aplt. at 13. Therefore, Ross demonstrates no error in the post-conviction 
court's conclusion that his claim of trial counsel ineffectiveness was procedurally 
barred. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-9-106(l)(c). 
IL ROSS'S CLAIM OF APPELLATE COUNSEL INEFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE FAILS AS A MATTER OF LAW 
Ross also sought post-conviction relief on a claim that his appellate counsel 
was ineffective for failing to raise on direct appeal his claim that trial counsel was 
ineffective for not asserting an extreme emotional distress defense. PCR.122. 
The post-conviction court agreed with the State that this claim failed as a matter 
of law. PCR.362-66 (Add. D). Ross demonstrates no error in that ruling. 
To demonstrate that his appellate counsel "was ineffective for omitting a 
claim/7 Ross had to show that the "'issue [was] obvious from the trial record and 
. . . probably would have resulted in reversal on appeal/" Lafferty v. State, 2007 
UT 73, | 39 175 P.3d 530 (quoting Taylor v. State, 2007 UT 12, f 16,156 P.3d 739) 
(alteration in original). 
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The post-conviction court found that Ross's challenge to trial counsel's 
decision not to raise an extreme emotional distress defense was not obvious from 
the trial record because that record demonstrated that (1) trial counsel had a 
strategic reason for not raising the defense and (2) Ross agreed with that strategy. 
PCR.363-65. Ross nevertheless argues that "[t]he numerous facts in the record 
suggesting [he] reacted to extreme emotional distress make it obvious that trial 
counsel could have and should have raised the affirmative defense/' Br. Aplt. at 
22. However, this is not a case where the record shows that trial counsel 
overlooked an obvious defense. Rather, trial counsel explained on the record 
that they recognized the possibility of raising the defense based on the facts of 
the case, but nevertheless made a conscious, strategic decision not to do so based 
on extra-record information. That strategic decision was presumptively 
reasonable. See State v. Taylor, 947 P.2d 681, 685 (Utah 1997) (recognizing the 
""'strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of 
reasonable professional assistance"'")(quoting State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182,186-
87 (Utah 1990)) (in turn quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984)). 
Given this record, the post-conviction court correctly concluded that the claim of 
trial counsel ineffectiveness was not obvious. 
The post-conviction court also concluded that the claim would not have 
likely resulted in reversal on appeal because Ross alleged no facts that appellate 
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counsel could have relied on to rebut the strong presumption that trial counsels' 
strategy was reasonable. PCR.365. Ross contends that a genuine issue of fact 
exists about the reasonableness of trial counsels' strategy because trial counsel 
failed to raise the defense even though there was evidence that tended to show 
that he acted under extreme emotional distress. Br. Aplt. at 16-22. Ross contends 
that trial counsel never fully explained their reasons for not raising the defense 
and no facts in the record demonstrate that trial counsel's strategy was, in fact, 
reasonable. Br. Aplt. at 25. Ross demonstrates no error in the post-conviction 
court's ruling because his argument ignores (1) that he had the burden of 
demonstrating ineffectiveness, and (2) that his counsels' strategic decision was 
presumptively reasonable. 
Ross erroneously presumes that the State had the burden of demonstrating 
that trial counsels' strategic decision was in fact reasonable, and therefore an 
ineffectiveness claim would have likely been unsuccessful on appeal. Br. Aplt. at 
25. He argues that the post-conviction court's grant of summary judgment was 
erroneous because "[t]he record contains no reasons for [trial counsel's] 
purported strategy, nor any analysis to support it." Id. He further asserts that 
"the post-conviction court cannot determine as a matter of law that a reasonable 
strategy existed when counsel did no more than state that he had a strategy." Id. 
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Ross's claim fails because he confuses which party bore the burden of 
proof below. The State did not have the burden of demonstrating that trial 
counsels' strategy was reasonable, and therefore an appellate claim of 
ineffectiveness would not have succeeded. Rather, as the petitioner, Ross bore 
the burden of demonstrating that his appellate counsel could have likely 
succeeded on this claim of trial counsel ineffectiveness. See Fernandez v. Cook, 870 
P.2d 870, 877 (Utah 1993) (recognizing that the petitioner "bears the burden of 
proving his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel"). To show that this claim 
would have likely succeeded on appeal, Ross had the burden of demonstrating 
that his appellate counsel could have likely shown that: (1) trial counsels' 
strategic decision not to raise the extreme emotional distress defense was 
objectively unreasonable and (2) there was a reasonable probability that the 
defense would have succeeded had trial counsel raised it. See Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 690, (1984); Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 521 
(Utah 1994). In so doing, Ross had the burden of showing how appellate counsel 
could have overcome the "strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls 
within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Taylor, 947 P.2d at 
685 (additional citations omitted). 
Because trial counsels' strategic decision was presumptively reasonable, 
Ross could not satisfy his burden simply by alleging that the trial record did not 
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fully explain the reasoning behind his counsels7 strategic decision. Rather, in 
responding to the State's summary judgment motion, Ross had to proffer facts 
that, if proven, would have rebutted the strong presumption that his trial 
counsel's decision was reasonable. However, he failed to do so. PCR.365. 
Therefore, the post-conviction court correctly granted the State summary 
judgment and denied this claim. 
Alternatively, Ross argues that he alleged sufficient facts to create a 
genuine issue of fact regarding the reasonableness of his counsels' strategic 
decision because he alleged that the evidence in his case would have supported 
an extreme emotional distress defense. Br. Aplt. at 19-23. He asserts that "[t]he 
presence of such facts are sufficient to rebut any presumption [that] trial 
counsel's strategy" was reasonable. Id. at 23. 
But the mere fact that there was some evidence to support an extreme 
emotional distress defense does not rebut the presumption that trial counsel 
acted reasonably in choosing not to raise that defense. Presumably anticipating 
this very claim of ineffectiveness, trial counsel made sure to explain on the record 
that they recognized that extreme emotional distress was a possible defense. 
TR.434:20-21. They further explained that they made a conscious and strategic 
decision not to raise that defense "because of evidentiary problems" that were 
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known only to Ross and counsel.5 TR.434:20-21. Ross agreed with that strategy. 
TR.434:21-22. This strategic decision was presumptively reasonable. See Taylor, 
947P.2dat685. 
Ross could not overcome this presumption of reasonableness by merely 
arguing that the evidence could have supported the defense. Trial counsel 
explained that they recognized that the evidence supported the defense. They 
nevertheless made a strategic decision not to raise it based on "evidentiary 
problems'7 known to trial counsel and Ross that supported counsel's decision, 
and that have never been revealed. TR.434:21. In opposing the State's summary 
judgment motion, Ross had the burden to proffer evidence of what those 
evidentiary problems were in order to rebut the presumption that, based on that 
undisclosed information, counsel made a reasonable decision. Ross's allegations 
in his memorandum supporting his petition may provide some insight into what 
those evidentiary problems were. If Ross disclosed to his counsel that he and 
Christensen "were sexually active with other partners," PCR.78, that disclosure 
would have undercut an extreme emotional distress defense based on Ross 
finding Christensen with another man. 
5
 As explained in the case and fact statement, counsel did not go on to 
explain their reasoning on the record because they anticipated that reasoning to 
become clear when Ross testified at the penalty hearing. TR.434:21. 
Unfortunately, however, the penalty hearing became unnecessary when later 
negotiations lead to an agreed upon sentence of life without parole. TR.435:2, 9. 
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The post-conviction court correctly found that because "trial counsel's 
decision not to raise the affirmative defense was strategic, [Ross] must set forth 
facts and argument to rebut the strong presumption of effectiveness regarding 
this decision/7 PCR.365 (Add. D). Ross had to do more than show that counsel 
could have raised the defense. He had to allege facts that, if proven, would 
demonstrate why it was unreasonable not to raise the defense even though the 
evidence supported it. 
Ross alleged no such facts below even though [he] discussed the issue with 
his defense counsel "a lot, on numerous occasions/' TR.434:21. He did not 
explain what he understood to be the reasoning behind his defense counsels' 
decision. He provided no analysis why that decision was unreasonable. Nor did 
he explain why he agreed with that decision at trial, even though he now 
considers it unreasonable. Rather, he simply argued below —as he does in his 
appellate brief—that his trial counsel were ineffective for failing to raise the 
defense because there was evidence to support it. PCR.85-90; Br. Aplt. at 19-27. 
However, as explained, that allegation was insufficient on this record to rebut the 
presumption that trial counsels' strategic decision was reasonable. 
Ross does point to one reference in his opposition to the State's summary 
judgment motion that, according to him, raised a genuine issue of fact as to the 
reasonableness of his counsels' strategy. Br. Aplt. at 28. He claims in his brief 
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that he alleged below that his trial counsel told him that they did not raise the 
extreme emotional distress defense because "he was of 'sound mind.'" Id. He 
argues that this allegation was sufficient to raise an issue of material fact "as to 
whether counsel misunderstood the law" and therefore made an unreasonable 
strategic decision "[b]ecause of soundness of mind is irrelevant to an extreme 
emotional distress affirmative defense." Br. Aplt. at 28-29. 
However, this reference did not create an issue of material fact because it 
did not refer to Ross's explanation of the reasons that counsel did not raise a 
defense of extreme emotional distress. Rather, the statement that Ross was of 
"sound mind" refers to Ross's understanding of why counsel did not raise a 
defense claiming that he acted under a delusion attributable to mental illness. 
PCR.336-337 (a copy of Ross's opposition to the State's summary judgment 
motion is included as Addendum E). 
Ross discussed a defense based on a delusion attributable to mental illness 
because he believed that the State had misinterpreted his petition to claim that 
his counsel was ineffective for failing to raise that defense, rather than his 
original claim regarding the omission of an extreme emotional distress defense. 
PCR.336-37. In his opposition to the State's summary judgment motion, Ross 
first referred to the portion of the criminal record on which the State relied —trial 
counsel's explanation that, because of "evidentiary problems" known only to 
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Ross and counsel, "[t]here was no manslaughter defense raised based on any 
extreme emotional disturbance/' PCR.336. Ross then argued that "[t]he 
'manslaughter defense' Respondents appear to be relying on is Utah Code 76-5-
205[(]l[)](c), which refers to 76-5-205.5 and is defined there as 'a delusion 
attributable to a mental illness....'" PCR.336-37. 
Ross then explained that he was not claiming that his trial counsel were 
ineffective for failing to raise a defense based on a delusion attributable to a 
mental illness, but rather an extreme emotional distress defense. PCR.336. 
Apparently seeing a distinction between an emotional disturbance and an 
emotional distress defense, Ross explained: 
However, Respondents are completely off point here: manslaughter 
and its 'emotional disturbance defense' is not what was claimed, nor 
held by the order below, or Petitioner.6 
What was held to be the issue was 76-5-202-3-a-i, 'under the 
influence of extreme emotional distress for which there is a 
reasonable explanation or excuse.' 
PCR.336 (emphasis added). Thus, in his opposition to the State's summary 
judgment motion, Ross was using the phrase "extreme emotional disturbance" to 
6
 In referring to "the order below," Ross presumably means the post-
conviction court's order requiring the State to respond to his claims (PCR.255-57). 
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refer to a defense that he acted under a delusion attributable to a mental illness, 
not an extreme emotional distress defense.7 
Ross then explained that his counsel "did not raise a 'manslaughter 
defense based on any extreme emotional disturbance' because counsel had 
inferred that the mental evaluations were holding him of sound mind, and that 
the evidence of the case precluded raising that defense." PCR.336. Ross further 
explained that his defense counsel told him "the mental evaluations would not 
support" a delusion defense. PCR.337. 
In their proper context, Ross's explanation that his trial counsel did not 
raise a manslaughter defense because he was "of sound mind" did not refer to 
counsels' reasons for not raising an extreme emotional distress defense. Rather, 
Ross was explaining why counsel did not raise a defense of delusion attributable 
7
 The phrases "extreme emotional disturbance" and "extreme emotional 
distress" do not refer to different defenses. When trial counsel referred to the 
defense as "extreme emotional disturbance" he was simply using an old 
statutory label for the extreme emotional distress defense. At the time of Ross's 
trial, the statute described the defense as one of "extreme emotional distress/' See 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-202(3)(a)(i) (West 2004) ("It is an affirmative defense to a 
charge of aggravated murder . . . that the defendant caused the death of another . 
. . under the influence of extreme emotional distress for which there is a 
reasonable explanation or excuse.") (emphasis added). However, statutes had 
earlier referred to the defense as one of "extreme emotional disturbance/' See 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-202(1)(b) (1997) ("Criminal homicide constitutes 
manslaughter if the actor: . . . (b) causes the death of another under the influence 
of extreme emotional disturbance for which there is a reasonable explanation or 
excuse.") (emphasis added). Therefore, trial counsel was simply referring to the 
extreme emotional distress defense by its old statutory label. 
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to a mental illness. Therefore, contrary to Ross's contention in his brief, his 
explanation of his counsels' reasoning did not create a genuine issue of material 
fact regarding the reasonableness of counsels' decision not to raise an extreme 
emotional distress defense. 
Ross alleged no facts explaining why his counsel unreasonably chose not 
to raise the extreme emotional distress defense. Therefore, the post-conviction 
court correctly found that Ross had failed to allege any basis on which appellate 
counsel could have overcome the presumption that trial counsel performed 
effectively in deciding not to raise an extreme emotional distress defense. 
PCR.365 (Add. D). Consequently, the post-conviction court correctly concluded 
that Ross's claim of appellate counsel ineffectiveness failed as a matter of law. 
III. THE POST-CONVICTION COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION IN DENYING ROSS'S MOTION FOR 
APPOINTMENT OF PRO BONO COUNSEL 
Ross filed two motions for the appointment of pro bono counsel under 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-9-1Q9. PCR.1-2, 263. He filed the first motion with his 
petition and his second motion when he filed his supporting memorandum. 
PCR.1-2, 263. The post-conviction court denied Ross's motions as premature. 
PCR. 265=66 (Add. F). The post-conviction court reasoned that it was not clear 
whether Ross needed counsel when he filed his motions because the complexity 
of Ross's remaining claims and the need for an evidentiary hearing was 
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uncertain. Id. The court had dismissed the majority of Ross's claims as frivolous 
and the State had yet to respond to the remaining claims. Id. 
Ross argues that "the post-conviction court abused its discretion in 
denying [his] requests for counsel because the petition involved complicated 
issues of law and fact." Br. Aplt. at 34 (bolding and capitalization omitted). On 
the contrary, the post-conviction court appropriately exercised its discretion 
because it was not clear that the case had become so complicated that it exceeded 
Ross's ability to proceed on his own. Moreover, Ross never renewed his motion 
after he received the State's summary judgment motion. 
This Court "will find that a trial court has abused its discretion 'only if the 
trial court's decision was beyond the limits of reasonability.'" State v. Arguelles, 
2003 UT 1, Tf 101, 63 P.3d 731 (quoting State v. Olsen, 860 P.2d 332, 334 (Utah 
1993)). Thus, "an abuse of discretion occurs if the trial court's actions are 
'inherently unfair' or 'if [this Court] conclude[s] that no reasonable [person] 
would take the view adopted by the trial court.'" Id. (quoting State v. Russell, 791 
P.2d 188, 192 (Utah 1990) & State v. Schweitzer, 943 P.2d 649, 651 (Utah 
Ct.App.1997)) (last alteration in original). 
"[T]here is no statutory or constitutional right to counsel in a civil petition 
for post-convcition relief." Hutchings v. State, 2003 UT 52, f 20, 84 P.3d 1150 
(citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-35a-109 (1999) and Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 
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551, 555-56 (1987)). Nevertheless, the PCRA grants a post-conviction court 
discretion to appoint pro bono counsel to an indigent petitioner if the court 
concludes that the circumstances of the case merit such an appointment. UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 78B-9-109 (West 2009). The PCRA provides that "[i]f any portion of 
the petition is not summarily dismissed, the court may, upon the request of an 
indigent petitioner, appoint counsel on a pro bono basis to represent the 
petitioner in the post-conviction court or on post-conviction appeal/' Id. § 78B-9-
109(1). The PCRA also gives the court some guidance in determining when it is 
appropriate to appoint counsel. See id. at 78B-9-109(2). It states that "[i]n 
determining whether to appoint counsel, the court shall consider the following 
factors: (a) whether the petition or the appeal contains factual allegations that 
will require an evidentiary hearing; and (b) whether the petition involves 
complicated issues of law or fact that require the assistance of counsel for proper 
adjudication/'8 Id. 
8
 Ross argues that this Court has interpreted this provision as requiring a 
post-conviction court to appoint counsel whenever either of the two 
considerations in subsection 78B-9-109(2) exist. Br. Aplt. at 34. For support, he 
quotes a sentence from Ford v. State, 2008 UT 66, f 15,199 P.3d 892, in which this 
Court explains the content of the PCRA's provision for appointing pro bono 
counsel. Br. Aplt. at 34 (quoting Ford, 2008 UT 66, | 15). However, Ross reads 
too much into this sentence from Ford. The sentence does not interpret the PCRA 
and, in any event, is dicta. 
This Court did not interpret section 78B-9-109 in Ford. The issue there was 
"whether defendants who succeed in vacating their convictions in a post-
conviction relief proceeding are entitled to paid counsel to represent them during 
27 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The post-conviction court appropriately exercised its discretion in denying 
Ross's motions for appointment of pro bono counsel as premature. The true 
complexity of Ross's remaining claims and the need for an evidentiary hearing 
was uncertain where the State had not yet responded to the claims. Without the 
State's response it was unclear what defenses Ross would have to respond to and 
whether the claims could be summarily dismissed, or whether a hearing would 
be required. Therefore, the applicability of the section 78B-9-109(2) factors was 
unclear. 
the State's appeal." Ford, 2008 UT 66,11 (emphasis added). This Court held that 
such defendants are "entitled to the assistance of paid counsel on appeal 
pursuant to he Indigent Defense Act, the Utah Constitution, and the United 
States Constitution." Id. at f 14. In reaching this holding, the Court recognized 
that the PCRA's provision allowing for the appointment of pro bono counsel 
"does not conflict with the Indigent Defense Act." .Id. at f 15. The Court then 
explained the substance of the PCRA's provision, stating, "[t]he Act indicates 
such appointment should occur at the request of the petitioner, and where an 
evidentiary hearing would be required or the 'petition involves complicated 
issues of law or fact that required the assistance of counsel for proper 
adjudication.'" Id. (quoting § 78B-9-109(2)). 
Ross relies on this Court's use of the word "should," to support his 
argument that this Court interpreted the PCRA to require the appointment of 
counsel whenever either requirement of the subsection was met. Br. Aplt. at 34. 
In context, however, the Court was simply repeating the statutory language, not 
interpreting it. See Ford, 2008 UT 66 at \ 15. 
Even if this Court did interpret section 78b-9-109 in Ford, that 
interpretation is dicta because the issue in Ford did not involve appointment of 
pro bono counsel under the PCRA. See Beaver County v. Home Indem. Co., 52 P.2d 
4357 444-45 (Utah 1935) ("Obiter dicta is that part of an opinion which does not 
express any final conclusion on any legal question presented by the case for 
determination or any conclusion on any prin[c]iple of law which it is necessary 
to determine as basis for a final conclusion on one or more questions to be 
decided by the court") 
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Nor was it apparent on the face of Ross's pleadings that his claims were so 
complex that he could not proceed on his own. As explained above, Ross simply 
had to allege why his trial counsel chose not to raise an extreme emotional 
distress defense, and then explain why that choice was unreasonable under the 
circumstances of his case. The facts supporting these allegations and analysis 
were within Ross's grasp and ability. He was privy to the discussions 
surrounding his counsels' decision. Ross and his counsel had "talked about [that 
decision] a lot, on numerous occasions." TR.434:21. Moreover, trial counsel 
believed that Ross's own testimony would demonstrate the reasonableness of 
this decision. TR.434:21. Therefore, the reasonableness of counsels' decision 
appears to have been based entirely on facts that Ross knew. 
Ross's filings demonstrated that he had the ability to litigate his case on his 
own. Appellate counsel herself relies on what she characterizes as Ross's own 
"apt" articulation of his arguments below. Br. Aplt. at 29 (quoting PCR.115-16). 
Ross claims in his brief that "[discovering errors in an attorney's representation 
is difficult, if not impossible for a non-lawyer." Br. Aplt. at 36. However, he was 
able to file a pro se petition alleging fifteen claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel. PCR.68-71. Ross was also able to recognize the need to frame his 
surviving claim as one of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel to avoid the 
PCRA's procedural bar. PCR.122. Ross's memorandum supporting his post-
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conviction petition spans fifty-two pages and includes attachments containing 
over one hundred pages of discovery from the criminal case. PCR.73-124, 125-
241. In that memorandum, Ross provides a detailed statement of the facts of his 
case and a detailed discussion of the extreme emotional distress defense. 
i 
PRC.73-91. Ross understood the facts of his case and how the defense could have 
applied. In short, the record confirms the post-conviction court's conclusion that 
i 
Ross did not yet require pro bono counsel. 
Moreover, the post-conviction court did not foreclose Ross from renewing 
his motion after the State had responded to his claims. Rather, it expressly 
granted Ross "leave to renew his motion to appoint counsel at the proper time in 
the proceedings/' PCR.266. However, Ross never renewed his motion for i 
counsel after receiving the State's motion for summary judgment. Rather, he 
filed his opposition pro se. Therefore, he implicitly conceded that he did not 
require the assistance of counsel to respond to the State's motion. 
In sum, the applicability of the factors in section 78B-9-109(2) was unclear 
when Ross filed his motions for counsel and his filings to that point demonstrate 
that he could proceed on his own. Therefore, the post-conviction court's 
i 
conclusion that the motions were premature was not objectively unreasonable. 
Accordingly, the post-conviction court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
Ross's motions. See Arguelles, 2003 UT1,1101. < 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the denial of the 
petition for post-conviction relief. 
Respectfully submitted _«Z2_ August 2011. 
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Utah Attorney General 
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UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-9-106 (West Supp. 2011) Preclusion of relief -
Exception 
(1) A person is not eligible for relief under this chapter upon any ground that: 
(a) may still be raised on direct appeal or by a post-trial motion; 
(b) was raised or addressed at trial or on appeal; 
(c) could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal; 
(d) was raised or addressed in any previous request for post-conviction relief 
or could have been, but was not, raised in a previous request for post-
conviction relief; or 
(e) is barred by the limitation period established in Section 78B-9-107. 
(2) (a) The state may raise any of the procedural bars or time bar at any time, 
including during the state's appeal from an order granting post-conviction relief, 
unless the court determines that the state should have raised the time bar or 
procedural bar at an earlier time. 
(b) Any court may raise a procedural bar or time bar on its own motion, 
provided that it gives the parties notice and an opportunity to be heard. 
(3) Notwithstanding Subsection (l)(c), a person may be eligible for relief on a 
basis that the ground could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal, if 
the failure to raise that ground was due to ineffective assistance of counsel. 
(4) This section authorizes a merits review only to the extent required to address 
the exception set forth in Subsection (3). 
Credits 
Laws 2008, c. 3, § 1170, eff. Feb. 7, 2008; Laws 2008, c. 288, § 5, eff. May 5, 2008; 
Laws 2010, c. 48, § 1, eff. May 11, 2010. 
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UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-9-109 (West 2009) Appointment of pro bono counsel 
(1) If any portion of the petition is not summarily dismissed, the court may, upon 
the request of an indigent petitioner, appoint counsel on a pro bono basis to 
represent the petitioner in the post-conviction court or on post-conviction appeal. 
Counsel who represented the petitioner at trial or on the direct appeal may not 
be appointed to represent the petitioner under this section. 
(2) In determining whether to appoint counsel, the court shall consider the 
following factors: 
(a) whether the petition or the appeal contains factual allegations that will 
require an evidentiary hearing; and 
(b) whether the petition involves complicated issues of law or fact that require 
the assistance of counsel for proper adjudication. 
(3) An allegation that counsel appointed under this section was ineffective 
cannot be the basis for relief in any subsequent post-conviction petition. 
Credits 
Laws 2008, c. 3, § 1173, eff. Feb. 7, 2008; Laws 2008, c. 288, § 8, eff. May 5, 2008. 
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Utah R. Civ. P. 56. SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-
claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 
20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of a motion for 
summary judgment by the adverse party, move for summary judgment upon all 
or any part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-
claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, move for 
summary judgment as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits 
shall be in accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought shall be rendered if the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the 
issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of 
damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule judgment 
is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is 
necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and 
the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain 
what material facts exist without substantial controversy and what material facts 
are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make an order 
specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the 
extent to which the amount of damages or other relief is not in controversy, and 
directing such further proceedings in the action as are just Upon the trial of the 
action the facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the trial shall be 
conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and 
opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such 
facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the 
affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified 
copies of ail papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached 
thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented 
or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits. 
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in 
this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of 
the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this 
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rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. 
Summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against a party failing to file 
such a response. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a 
party opposing the motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify the party's opposition, the court may refuse the 
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such 
other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. If any of the affidavits presented pursuant to 
this rule are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court 
shall forthwith order the party presenting them to pay to the other party the 
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused, 
including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or attorney may be 
adjudged guilty of contempt. 
Credits 
[Amended effective November 1,1997; November 1, 2004.] 
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Utah R. Civ. P. 65C POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 
(a) Scope. This rule governs proceedings in all petitions for post-conviction relief 
filed under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act, Utah Code Title 78B, Chapter 9. 
The Act sets forth the manner and extent to which a person may challenge the 
legality of a criminal conviction and sentence after the conviction and sentence 
have been affirmed in a direct appeal under Article I, Section 12 of the Utah 
Constitution, or the time to file such an appeal has expired. 
(b) Procedural defenses and merits review. Except as provided in paragraph 
(h), if the court comments on the merits of a post-conviction claim, it shall first 
clearly and expressly determine whether that claim is independently precluded 
under Section 78B-9-106. 
(c) Commencement and venue. The proceeding shall be commenced by filing a 
petition with the clerk of the district court in the county in which the judgment of 
conviction was entered. The petition should be filed on forms provided by the 
court. The court may order a change of venue on its own motion if the petition is 
filed in the wrong county. The court may order a change of venue on motion of a 
party for the convenience of the parties or witnesses. 
(d) Contents of the petition. The petition shall set forth all claims that the 
petitioner has in relation to the legality of the conviction or sentence. The petition 
shall state: 
(d)(1) whether the petitioner is incarcerated and, if so, the place of incarceration; 
(d)(2) the name of the court in which the petitioner was convicted and sentenced 
and the dates of proceedings in which the conviction was entered, together with 
the court's case number for those proceedings, if known by the petitioner; 
(d)(3) in plain and concise terms, all of the facts that form the basis of the 
petitioner's claim to relief; 
(d)(4) whether the judgment of conviction, the sentence, or the commitment for 
violation of probation has been reviewed on appeal, and, if so, the number and 
title of the appellate proceeding, the issues raised on appeal, and the results of 
the appeal; 
(d)(5) whether the legality of the conviction or sentence has been adjudicated in 
any prior post-conviction or other civil proceeding, and, if so, the case number 
and title of those proceedings, the issues raised in the petition, and the results of 
the prior proceeding; and 
(d)(6) if the petitioner claims entitlement to relief due to newly discovered 
evidence, the reasons why the evidence could not have been discovered in time 
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for the claim to be addressed in the trial, the appeal, or any previous post-
conviction petition. 
(e) Attachments to the petition. If available to the petitioner, the petitioner shall 
attach to the petition: 
(e)(1) affidavits, copies of records and other evidence in support of the 
allegations; 
(e)(2) a copy of or a citation to any opinion issued by an appellate court 
regarding the direct appeal of the petitioner's case; 
(e)(3) a copy of the pleadings filed by the petitioner in any prior post-conviction 
or other civil proceeding that adjudicated the legality of the conviction or 
sentence; and 
(e)(4) a copy of all relevant orders and memoranda of the court. 
(f) Memorandum of authorities. The petitioner shall not set forth argument or 
citations or discuss authorities in the petition, but these may be set out in a 
separate memorandum, two copies of which shall be filed with the petition. 
(g) Assignment. On the filing of the petition, the clerk shall promptly assign and 
deliver it to the judge who sentenced the petitioner. If the judge who sentenced 
the petitioner is not available, the clerk shall assign the case in the normal course. 
(h)(1) Summary dismissal of claims. The assigned judge shall review the 
petition, and, if it is apparent to the court that any claim has been adjudicated in 
a prior proceeding, or if any claim in the petition appears frivolous on its face, 
the court shall forthwith issue an order dismissing the claim, stating either that 
the claim has been adjudicated or that the claim is frivolous on its face. The order 
shall be sent by mail to the petitioner. Proceedings on the claim shall terminate 
with the entry of the order of dismissal. The order of dismissal need not recite 
findings of fact or conclusions of law. 
(h)(2) A claim is frivolous on its face when, based solely on the allegations 
contained in the pleadings and attachments, it appears that: 
(h)(2)(A) the facts alleged do not support a claim for relief as a matter of law; 
(h)(2)(B) the claim has no arguable basis in fact; or 
(h)(2)(C) the claim challenges the sentence only and the sentence has expired 
prior to the filing of the petition. 
(h)(3) If a claim is not frivolous on its face but is deficient due to a pleading error 
or failure to comply with the requirements of this rule, the court shall return a 
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copy of the petition with leave to amend within 20 days. The court may grant 
one additional 20 day period to amend for good cause shown. 
(h)(4) The court shall not review for summary dismissal the initial post-
conviction petition in a case where the petitioner is sentenced to death. 
(i) Service of petitions. If, on review of the petition, the court concludes that all 
or part of the petition should not be summarily dismissed, the court shall 
designate the portions of the petition that are not dismissed and direct the clerk 
to serve a copy of the petition, attachments and memorandum by mail upon the 
respondent. If the petition is a challenge to a felony conviction or sentence, the 
respondent is the state of Utah represented by the Attorney General. In all other 
cases, the respondent is the governmental entity that prosecuted the petitioner. 
(j) Answer or other response. Within 30 days (plus time allowed under these 
rules for service by mail) after service of a copy of the petition upon the 
respondent, or within such other period of time as the court may allow, the 
respondent shall answer or otherwise respond to the portions of the petition that 
have not been dismissed and shall serve the answer or other response upon the 
petitioner in accordance with Rule 5(b). Within 30 days (plus time allowed for 
service by mail) after service of any motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, 
the petitioner may respond by memorandum to the motion. No further 
pleadings or amendments will be permitted unless ordered by the court. 
(k) Hearings. Adter pleadings are closed, the court shall promptly set the 
proceeding for a hearing or otherwise dispose of the case. The court may also 
order a prehearing conference, but the conference shall not be set so as to delay 
unreasonably the hearing on the merits of the petition. At the prehearing 
conference, the court may: 
(k)(l) consider the formation and simplification of issues; 
(k)(2) require the parties to identify witnesses and documents; and 
(k)(3) require the parties to establish the admissibility of evidence expected to be 
presented at the evidentiary hearing. 
(1) Presence of the petitioner at hearings. The petitioner shall be present at the 
prehearing conference if the petitioner is not represented by counsel. The 
prehearing conference may be conducted by means of telephone or video 
conferencing. The petitioner shall be present before the court at hearings on 
dispositive issues but need not otherwise be present in court during the 
proceeding. The court may conduct any hearing at the correctional facility where 
the petitioner is confined. 
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(m) Discovery; records. Discovery under Rules 26 through 37 shall be allowed 
by the court upon motion of a party and a determination that there is good cause 
to believe that discovery is necessary to provide a party with evidence that is 
likely to be admissible at an evidentiary hearing. The court may order either the 
petitioner or the respondent to obtain any relevant transcript or court records. 
(n) Orders; stay. 
(n)(l) If the court vacates the original conviction or sentence, it shall enter 
findings of fact and conclusions of law and an appropriate order. If the petitioner 
is serving a sentence for a felony conviction, the order shall be stayed for 5 days. 
Within the stay period, the respondent shall give written notice to the court and 
the petitioner that the respondent will pursue a new trial, pursue a new sentence, 
appeal the order, or take no action. Thereafter the stay of the order is governed 
by these rules and by the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
(n)(2) If the respondent fails to provide notice or gives notice that no action will 
be taken, the stay shall expire and the court shall deliver forthwith to the 
custodian of the petitioner the order to release the petitioner. 
(n)(3) If the respondent gives notice that the petitioner will be retried or 
resentenced, the trial court may enter any supplementary orders as to 
arraignment, trial, sentencing, custody, bail, discharge, or other matters that may 
be necessary and proper. 
(o) Costs. The court may assign the costs of the proceeding, as allowed under 
Rule 54(d), to any party as it deems appropriate. If the petitioner is indigent, the 
court may direct the costs to be paid by the governmental entity that prosecuted 
the petitioner. If the petitioner is in the custody of the Department of Corrections, 
Utah Code Title 78A, Chapter 2, Part 3 governs the manner and procedure by 
which the trial court shall determine the amount, if any, to charge for fees and 
costs. 
(p) Appeal. Any final judgment or order entered upon the petition may be 
appealed to and reviewed by the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court of Utah 
in accord with the statutes governing appeals to those courts. 
Credits 
[Adopted effective July 1,1996; amended effective November 1, 2008; January 4, 
2010.] 
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19 
FOLLOW THE BAILIFF AT THIS TIME. 
(THE JURY EXITS THE COURTROOM.) 
THE COURT: YOU TWO ALTERNATES ARE EXCUSED AT THIS 
TIME. YOU'RE WELCOME TO GO BACK THROUGH THERE AND JUST LEAVE 
YOUR TABLETS AND YOUR I.D.S THERE ON THE BAILIFF'S DESK. 
WE'LL KEEP THOSE FOR YOU. THEY WILL NOT BE LOOKED AT; 
THEY'RE YOUR ITEMS. BUT THEN IF YOU'D REPORT BACK WHEN WE 
CALL YOU. 
WAIT JUST A MINUTE. THE CLERK WILL GET SOME PHONE 
NUMBERS FROM YOU. OKAY? 
(ALTERNATE JURORS LEAVE THE COURTROOM.) . 
THE COURT: THE JURY IS OUT. MR. MCGUIRE, ANYTHING 
FURTHER TO COME BEFORE THE COURT? 
MR. McGUIRE: NO, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: MR. MCCAUGHEY? 
MR. McGUIRE: YOUR HONOR, THERE IS — WE NEED TO 
MAKE A RECORD, AND I THINK WE NEED TO DO IT IN THE COURT'S 
CHAMBERS. IT WOULD BE OKAY, I'M SURE, AFTER THE TRIAL'S 
OVER, JUST IF WE CAN MAKE A RECORD. 
THE COURT: OKAY. WE'LL BE IN RECESS THEN. YOU'RE 
WELCOME TO COME IN CHAMBERS. WE'LL RECONVENE WHEN THE JURY 
RETURNS. 
COURT IS IN RECESS. 
(RECESS TAKEN) 
THE COURT: WE ARE IN CHAMBERS IN THE MATTER OF 
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STATE VERSUS ROSS. STATE I S PRESENT REPRESENTED BY 
MR. MCGUIRE, MR. MAJOR. THE DEFENDANT, MR. ROSS, I S PRESENT 
REPRESENTED BY HIS ATTORNEYS, MR. MCCAUGHEY AND MR. ALBRIGHT. 
THERE I S A MATTER YOU WANTED TO PUT ON THE RECORD, 
MR. MCCAUGHEY? 
MR. McCAUGHEY: THERE I S , YOUR HONOR, AND — AND 
I T ' S A MATTER I THINK SHOULD BE PUT ON THE RECORD. 
* ir-r\ n n n n "T\ -KTT-N *r TTTPVT TT-I m T\ T T / n TN -n T-\ /^\ T T m I-TITT -r rt T^ri-m -nrt m/-\ m n n 
r i j \ . KUOO rtiNu ± nrtVL H\IJ!\CJU h D u u i i n i o , o u i n o I U I D L 
MATTER OF STRATEGY THAT WAS IN THIS CASE — AND I THINK I T ' S 
IMPORTANT MAYBE FOR LATER ON DOWN THE ROAD. 
BASICALLY, MR.— MR. — WHEN I REPRESENTED — STARTED 
REPRESENTING MR. ROSS WE SPOKE — I SPOKE WITH THE COUNTY 
ATTORNEY AND THERE WAS AN OFFER MADE. I F MR. ROSS WOULD 
PLEAD GUILTY, HE WOULD RECEIVE LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE. MR. ROSS 
AND I DISCUSSED THAT. IT WAS HIS DECISION THAT HE DID NOT 
WANT LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE, THAT — THAT HE, IN FACT, DESIRED 
THE DEATH PENALTY. 
AND I INSTRUCTED HIM AT THAT POINT THAT EVEN I F HE PLED 
GUILTY — AND THERE WAS A QUESTION OF WHETHER OR NOT THERE 
COULD BE AN ADMISSION — EVIDENCE PROBLEMS IN TAKING THAT 
GUILTY PLEA OF MR. ROSS - - GIVING THAT GUILTY PLEA. 
BUT IN THE EVENT THE GUILTY PLEA WAS ACCEPTED, I 
EXPLAINED TO HIM THAT THERE WOULD STILL BE THE NECESSITY OF A 
HEARING, A SENTENCING HEARING, THAT THE JUDGE CAN NOT IMPOSE 
THE DEATH PENALTY WITHOUT THAT HEARING. 
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AND I ADVISED HIM, MR. ROSS, THAT IF THAT WAS HIS 
POSITION THEN IT WAS TO HIS BENEFIT TO HAVE A TRIAL BECAUSE, 
BASICALLY, THE SAME EVIDENCE WOULD BE INTRODUCED AT THE 
SENTENCING HEARING AS A TRIAL. AND IF HE HAD THE TRIAL, THAT 
WOULD KEEP HIS OPTIONS OPEN, NOT ONLY FOR POSSIBLE APPEAL 
DOWN THE ROAD, BUT ALSO FOR HIS TESTIMONY AT THE PENALTY 
PHASE OF THE HEARING. -
I THINK THE COURT CAN QUESTION MR. ROSS, BUT MR. ROSS 
WAS IN AGREEMENT WITH THAT STRATEGY. I THINK WE FOLLOWED 
THROUGH WITH THAT STRATEGY. THERE WAS NO MANSLAUGHTER 
DEFENSE RAISED BASED ON ANY EXTREME EMOTIONAL DISTURBANCE 
BECAUSE OF -- BECAUSE OF EVIDENTIARY PROBLEMS AS ARE KNOWN TO 
MR. ROSS AND MYSELF. 
BUT ANYWAY, THAT STRATEGY HAS BEEN FOLLOWED AND I THINK 
IF THERE IS A PENALTY PHASE, MR. ROSS WILL TESTIFY. AND I 
THINK ONCE THAT HAPPENS, WHAT HE TESTIFIES TO IS REVEALED, I 
THINK WE'LL — WE'LL SHOW THE — THE REASONABLENESS OF THAT 
STRATEGY. AND SO I JUST WANTED TO PUT THAT ON THE RECORD IN 
CASE DOWN THE ROAD, WHO KNOWS WHAT WILL HAPPEN. 
BUT ANYWAY, THAT'S THE REASON I'VE DONE WHAT I'VE DONE. 
I THINK MR. ROSS — HE AND I HAVE TALKED ABOUT THIS A LOT, ON 
NUMEROUS OCCASIONS, AND I THINK HE AGREES WITH THAT STRATEGY. 
SO I'D LIKE TO PUT THAT ON THE RECORD. 
THE COURT: MR. ROSS, IS THAT, IN FACT, THE 
CONVERSATION AND THE STRATEGY THAT YOU AND MR. MCCAUGHEY HAVE 
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1 DECIDED ON IN THIS CASE? 
2 THE DEFENDANT: YES, YOUR HONOR. 
3 THE COURT: OKAY. THANK YOU. 
4 ALL RIGHT. WE'LL BE IN RECESS THEN UNTIL THE JURY 
5 RETURNS. 
6 MR. McCAUGHEY: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
7 (PROCEEDING CONCLUDE IN CHAMBERS.) 
d 1UUKI KiVIUKlNS . ; 
9 THE COURT: WE'RE BACK IN SESSION. THE PARTIES AND 
10 COUNSEL ARE PRESENT. THE JURY HAS RETURNED. 
11 LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, HAVE YOU ELECTED A MEMBER OF YOUR 
12 JURY AS FOREPERSON? 
13 A JUROR: YES, YOUR HONOR. 
14 THE COURT: THAT'S YOU, MR. GOUGH? 
15 A JUROR: YES, SIR. 
16 THE COURT: HAS THE JURY REACHED A VERDICT? 
17 A JUROR: YES, SIR. 
18 THE COURT: PLEASE DELIVER IT TO THE BAILIFF. 
19 THANK YOU, AND YOU MAY BE SEATED. 
20 (VERDICT TENDERED TO THE COURT). 
21 THE COURT: MR. ROSS, IF YOU'D PLEASE STAND? 
22 WE'LL ASK THE CLERK TO READ THE VERDICT. 
23 (THE CLERK READS THE VERDICT.) 
24 THE COURT: YOU MAY BE SEATED. 
25 MR. MCCAUGHEY, DO YOU WISH THE JURY POLLED? 
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174 P-3d 628 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Trovon Donta ROSS, Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 20041073. Nov. 2, 2007. 
Synopsis 
Background: Defendant was convicted by a jury in the 
Second District Court, Farmington, Rodney S. Page. J., 
of aggravated murder and attempted aggravated murder. 
Defendant appealed. 
Holdings: The Supreme Court, Nehring. J., held that: 
1 aggravated murder statute was not unconstitutionally vague 
as applied to defendant; 
2 as a matter of first impression, trial court's act of impaneling 
an anonymous jury did not constitute plain error; 
3. the State's remarks during closing arguments did not 
constitute prosecutorial misconduct; and 
4 in a separate opinion, Durham, CJ., held that defendant's 
convictions for aggravated murder and attempted aggravated 
murder merged. 
Affirmed in part and vacated in part. 
Nehring, J., dissented in part and was joined by Wilkins, CJ. 
WestHeadnotes(17) 
1 Criminal Law 
#** Constitutional issues in general 
The issue of whether a statute is constitutional 
is a question of law, which the Supreme Court 
reviews for correctness, giving no deference to the 
trial court. 
2 Cases that cite this headnote 
2 Criminal Law 
#** Necessity of Objections in General 
To prevail under plain error review, a defendant 
must demonstrate that (1) an error exists; (2) 
the error should have been obvious to the trial 
court; and (3) the error is harmful, or, absent the 
error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more 
favorable outcome. 
5 Cases that cite this headnote 
Constitutional Law 




Aggravated murder statute was not 
unconstitutionally vague as applied to defendant; 
statute was sufficiently clear to provide defendant 
notice that his behavior in murdering the victim 
and attempting to murder her boyfriend while 
both were at the victim's house was prohibited, as 
the terms "act," "scheme," "course of conduct," 
and "criminal episode" had common, easily 
understood meanings. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 
14; West's U.C.A. $ 76-5-202(TW). 
Sentencing and Punishment 
#* Provision authorizing death penalty 
Defendant lacked standing to argue on appeal that 
the aggravated murder statute's alleged vagueness 
exposed him to cruel and unusual punishment, 
where defendant was not sentenced to death for 
his crimes. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 8; West's 
U.CA. $ 76-5-2Q2mfb). 
1 Cases that cite this headnote 
Sentencing and Punishment 
€— Aggravating or mitigating circumstances 
The Eighth Amendment requires that statutory 
aggravators channel the sentencefs discretion by 
clear and objective standards that provide specific 
and detailed guidance and that make rationally 
reviewable the process for imposing a sentence of 
death. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 8. 
Sentencing and Punishment 
w* Provision authorizing death penalty 
In a case where the government does not seek 
the death penalty or where the defendant is not 
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sentenced to death, there can be no actual or 
threatened injury caused by vagueness in the 
death penalty statute that is sufficient to justify 
standing to challenge the constitutionality of the 
statute under the Eighth Amendment. U.S.C.A. 
Const.Amend. 8. 
1 Cases that cite this headnote 
7 Constitutional Law 
#— Certainty and defmiteness: vagueness 
In order to establish that statutes are so 
vague that they violate due process, a 
defendant must demonstrate either (1) that the 
statutes do not provide the kind of notice 
that enables ordinary people to understand 
what conduct is prohibited, or (2) that the 
statutes encourage arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14. 
1 Cases that cite this headnote 
8 Criminal Law 
#* Summoning and impaneling jury 
Trial court's act of impaneling an anonymous jury 
did not constitute plain error or require a new 
murder trial; trial court had a compelling reason 
to impanel an anonymous jury due to defendant's 
involvement in organized crime, his past attempts 
to interfere with the judicial process, and the fact 
that extensive pretrial publicity could enhance the 
possibility that the jurors names would become 
public, and the trial court took precautions to 
mitigate any potential prejudice to defendant. 
3 Cases that cite this headnote 
9 Criminal Law 
#^ Role and Obligations of Judge 
Judges properly enjoy considerable latitude in 
conducting the affairs of their courtroom so long 
as courtroom procedures do not communicate 
bias against the defendant. 
10 Jury 
<t«- Designation and identity of jurors 
When impaneling an anonymous jury, the 
Supreme Court deems it wise that trial courts 
exercise their discretion in a manner consistent 
with the approach adopted by the federal courts, 
which includes: (1) finding a compelling reason 
to believe the jury needs protection from external 
sources, and (2) taking reasonable precautions to 
minimize any prejudicial effects on the defendant 
and to ensure that the defendant's rights are 
protected. 
3 Cases that cite this headnote 
11 Jury 
mem T^peirrnntinn nnr\ iHpnt i tw n f tn rnrc 
Courts typically rely on two general precautions 
to minimize the prejudicial effects of an 
anonymous jury: (1) ensuring a meaningful 
voir dire to expose bias, and (2) offering jury 
instructions designed to eliminate any implication 
of the defendant's guilt. 
3 Cases that cite this headnote 
12 Criminal Law 
i™ Homicide and assault with intent to kill 
The State's remarks during closing arguments, 
which stretched the evidence regarding whether 
defendant's shooting of victim and victim's 
boyfriend was incident to one act, scheme, course 
of conduct, or criminal episode, did not constitute 
prosecutorial misconduct, in prosecution for 
aggravated murder and attempted aggravated 
murder; defendant conceded in closing argument 
that he killed victim and attempted to kill her 
boyfriend, and evidence established that the 
murder and attempted murder were part of one 
act, scheme or course of conduct as defendant 
showed up at the victim's home with a loaded gun, 
he spoke with victim and her boyfriend and then 
shot victim, victim's boyfriend attempted to flee 
and defendant chased him and fired six shots at 
him, hitting him once, and then he left the scene 
and called the victim's father and informed him 
that he had killed victim and was on his way to 
father's house to "finish the job." West's U.C.A. 
§ 76-5-202(1)0)). 
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1 Cases that cite this headnote 
13 Criminal Law 
#» Conduct of counsel in general 
If prosecutorial misconduct is established, the 
State must show that the error was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
1 Cases that cite this headnote 
14 Criminal Law 
#» Inferences from and Effect of Evidence 
Appellate review of a prosecutor's conduct must 
take into account that a prosecutor has the duty 
and right to argue the case based on the total 
picture shown by the evidence or the lack thereof. 
15 Criminal Law 
#** Scope of and Effect of Summing Up 
Criminal Law 
#» Inferences from and Effect of Evidence 
Counsel for both sides have considerable latitude 
in their closing arguments; they have the right to 
fully discuss from their perspectives the evidence 
and all inferences and deductions it supports. 
16 Criminal Law 
#•» Merger of offenses 
Defendant's convictions for aggravated murder 
and attempted aggravated murder merged, and 
thus defendant could only be convicted of 
aggravated murder; attempted murder was a 
necessary element to prove the offense of 
aggravated murder. (Per Durham, C.J., for a 
majority of the court.) U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5: 
West's U.C.A. $$ 76-1-402(3). 76-5-202. 
1 Cases that cite this headnote 
17 Homicide 
#•» First Degree, Capital or Aggravated Murder 
Aggravated murder, a capital crime, requires 
proof of a statutorily defined aggravating 
circumstance in addition to an intentional and 
knowing killing. (Per Durham, C.J., for a majority 
of the court.) West's U.C.A. $ 76-5-202. 
Attorneys and Law Firms 
*629 Mark L. Shurtleff. Att'y Gen.. Matthew D. Bates. Asst. 
Att'y Gen., Salt Lake City, *630 Steven V. Major. William 
McGuire. Farmington, for plaintiff. 
Elizabeth Hunt. Salt Lake City, for defendant. 
Opinion 
NEHRING. Justice: 
If 1 Early on the morning of June 30, 2003, Trovon Ross 
arrived at the front door of the home of his ex-girlfriend, 
Annie Christensen. He carried a loaded gun. Mr. Ross entered 
the home, and after an exchange of words with his ex-
girlfriend and her current boyfriend, James May, Mr. Ross 
forced Ms. Christensen into a bedroom where he shot her 
three times, killing her. 
If 2 Mr. May made an attempt to flee in an automobile parked 
in the garage. But after being intercepted by Mr. Ross, Mr. 
May exited the car and took flight on foot. Mr. Ross chased 
him out of the garage and down the street, firing six shots at 
him. One shot struck Mr. May, wounding him. 
Tf 3 Mr. Ross was apprehended following a chase. He was 
charged and convicted of aggravated murder and attempted 
aggravated murder. At Mr. Ross's trial, the sole issue in 
contention was whether he should be convicted of murder or 
aggravated murder. Mr. Ross now challenges his conviction 
on the basis of four claims of error, only the first of which 
was preserved at the trial court level. First, Mr. Ross alleges 
he was convicted under an unconstitutional statute-Utah Code 
section 76-5-202(1 )(b) (2003). Second, Mr. Ross contends 
that his attempted aggravated murder conviction should 
merge with his aggravated murder conviction. Third, Mr. 
Ross asserts that the impaneling of an anonymous jury 
was unfairly prejudicial. And fourth, Mr. Ross believes the 
State committed prosecutorial misconduct during closing 
arguments, which affected the outcome of the case, requiring 
a new trial. We reject Mr. Ross's first, third, and fourth claims; 
however, the majority finds that the aggravated murder and 
attempted aggravated murder charges should merge and 
that the attempted aggravated murder conviction should be 
vacated. 
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_ _ _ _ _ 
BACKGROUND 
U 4 Mr. Ross knocked on Ms. Christensen's door in Clinton, 
Utah, at approximately 6:10 a.m. on June 30, 2003. Ms. 
Christensen answered the door and let him in the house. Mr. 
Ross waited in the front room while Ms. Christensen went to 
her bedroom and returned with her boyfriend, Mr. May. 
f 5 Mr. Ross began to interrogate Ms. Christensen about her 
relationship with Mr. May, asking intimate questions about 
their sexual activity. When Ms. Christensen did not respond 
to Mr. Ross's questions, he pulled a gun from his waistline and 
put the questions to Ms. Christensen again. Ms. Christensen 
repeatedly asked Mr. Ross to leave, but he would not do so 
until she answered his questions. 
% 6 Mr. Ross then asked Mr. May, "Do you have any family 
here?" Mr. May did not answer, and Mr. Ross responded, 
"I can't let her hurt you like she hurt me." Mr. Ross then 
grabbed Ms. Christensen, pointed the gun at her, and pushed 
her past Mr. May toward the bedroom. Mr. May believed Mr. 
Ross was going to kill both Ms. Christensen and him and, 
apparently in an effort to dissuade Mr. Ross from following 
through with his plan, told Mr. Ross that the Air Force would 
be looking for him. Unimpressed, Mr. Ross pushed past Mr. 
May and took Ms. Christensen to the bedroom. 
f 7 Mr. May fled to the garage and entered his car. Soon 
thereafter, he heard a gunshot, a pause, then two more 
gunshots. Mr. May's car was equipped with an ignition 
interlock device, requiring him to blow into a breathalyzer to 
demonstrate that he was not intoxicated before his car would 
start. He blew into the breathalyzer, but because his breathing 
was "too erratic," the breathalyzer would not permit ignition. 
If 8 Mr. Ross then appeared in the doorway to the garage. Mr. 
May threw his keys out of the car, fled the garage, and began 
to run down the street. Mr. Ross followed, firing six shots. 
The second shot went through Mr. May's right arm and into 
his chest, lodging itself under the skin in front of his ribs. 
If 9 Still able to run despite his wound, Mr. May ran from 
house to house searching for *631 assistance. He finally 
managed to stop a car in the street, and the driver called the 
police. An off-duty officer arrived, and Mr. May told him that 
Ms. Christensen had been shot and directed the officer to her 
house. 
K 10 At least two of Ms. Christensen's neighbors heard the 
gunfire and saw a white van back quickly out of her driveway, 
hitting a mailbox before speeding off. The neighbors called 
911 and reported the shots and the van's description. Clinton 
City police arrived at Ms. Christensen's house within minutes 
of the shooting and found her dead on the floor of her 
bedroom. An examination of her body revealed three gunshot 
wounds: one to the back right side of the head, one to the neck, 
and one to the abdomen. 
% 11 Meanwhile, at 6:20 that morning, Mr. Ross called Steven 
Christensen, Ms. Christensen's father. Mr. Ross informed Mr. 
Christensen that he had just killed his daughter and was "on 
[his] way to [Mr. Christensen's] home to finish the job." 
% 12 Several Clearfield City police officers heard the 
broadcast of the van's description and headed toward the area 
of the shooting. They passed the van en route, turned around, 
and activated their lights and sirens, but Mr. Ross would 
not pull over. The police eventually cornered Mr. Ross in a 
cul-de-sac of a residential area and, after a brief foot chase, 
arrested him. 
If 13 The State charged Mr. Ross with aggravated murder, 
attempted aggravated murder, and failure to obey an officer's 
signal to stop. Mr. Ross was tried before a jury in November 
2004. At trial, Mr. Ross did not contest his participation in 
the crimes, but rather limited his efforts to persuading the 
jury that he was not guilty of aggravated murder. Mr. Ross 
contended that the killing of Ms. Christensen and the shooting 
of Mr. May were not "committed incident to one act, scheme, 
course of conduct, or criminal episode" under Utah Code 
section 76-5-202(1 )(b) and thus did not amount to aggravated 
murder. 
1f 14 Concerned that the case might "generate substantial 
public interest and media attention," the trial court impaneled 
an anonymous jury "to protect the identity and privacy of 
the jurors[ ] and to protect jurors, witnesses, and parties from 
unnecessary commotion, confusion, or influence." The court 
sought to preserve the jurors' anonymity by assigning each 
of them a number by which they were identified during the 
trial. The court informed jurors on more than one occasion-
both verbally in the trial court proceedings and on the 
jury questionnaire that each prospective juror completed-
that the use of numbers was to protect their privacy and 
to encourage jurors' candor during the voir dire process. 
With one exception, each prospective juror was addressed 
by both name and number during in-chamber interviews 
conducted during the course of jury selection. In four different 
interviews, defense counsel referred to prospective jurors by 
name, and the State did so three times. 
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K 15 After a three-day trial, the jury convicted Mr. Ross of 
aggravated murder and all other charges. Mr. Ross waived 
his right to a jury in the penalty phase, and the State 
recommended he serve life without parole for the aggravated 
murder conviction. The court agreed and sentenced him to 
concurrent prison terms of life without parole, five years to 
life, and zero to five years. 
U 16 Mr. Ross appealed. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
I 2 H 17 Mr. Ross preserved only the first of his four 
issues raised on appeal. As Mr. Ross's constitutional claim 
was preserved, we review that issue for correctness. Wood 
v. Univ. of Utah Med. Or.. 2002 UT 134. Tj 7. 67 P.3d 436. 
"The issue of whether a statute is constitutional is a question 
of law, which we review for correctness, giving no deference 
to the trial court." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted). Mr. Ross's other three claims were unpreserved, and 
we review them for plain error. See State v. Pinder, 2005 UT 
15. f 45. 114 P.3d 551: State v. Nelson-Waggoner. 2004 UT 
29. H 16. 94 P.3d 186. To prevail under plain error review, 
a defendant must demonstrate that " l(i) an error exists; (ii) 
the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) 
the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable outcome.'" *632 State v. Lee, 
2006 UT 5. T26. 128 P.3d 1179 (quoting State v. Hassan. 
2004 UT 99. f 10. 108 P.3d 695). 
ANALYSIS 
1f 18 With our standard of review in hand, we turn to 
assessing the merits of Mr. Ross's four issues: (1) whether 
the subsection of the Utah death penalty statute, under 
which Mr. Ross stands convicted, is unconstitutionally vague; 
(2) whether Mr. Ross's aggravated murder conviction and 
attempted aggravated murder conviction should merge; (3) 
whether the impaneling of an anonymous jury prejudiced 
the jury against Mr. Ross; and (4) whether the alleged 
prosecutorial misconduct requires a new trial. 
1f 19 This opinion contains the majority as to issues (1), (3), 
and (4) and the dissent as to issue (2). The majority as to 
issue (2) is contained in the separate opinion of Chief Justice 
Durham, joined by Justice Durrant and Justice Parrish. The 
dissenting view in section II of this opinion is that of Justice 
Wilkins and me. 
I. UTAH CODE SECTION 76-5-202mfb) IS 
NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE 
3 4 U 20 We first address whether Utah Code section 
76-5-202(1 Vb) is unconstitutionally vague as applied to Mr. 
Ross. Mr. Ross insists that the vagueness of the aggravated 
murder statute does not measure up to the guarantees of 
due process of law and freedom from the imposition of 
cruel and unusual punishment enshrined in both the United 
States Constitution and the Utah Constitution. First, we hold 
that because Mr. Ross was not sentenced to death, he lacks 
standing to assert that the statute's vagueness exposed him to 
cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution.. Next, we reach the merits 
of Mr. Ross's constitutional due process assaults on section 
76-5-202(1 )(b), but we find that the statute survives them 
because it is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to Mr. 
Ross's conduct. 
f 21 Section 76-5-202(1 ¥b) provides in pertinent part that 
[c]riminal homicide constitutes aggravated murder if the 
actor intentionally or knowingly causes the death of 
another ... [where] the homicide was committed incident 
to one act, scheme, course of conduct, or criminal episode 
during which two or more persons were killed, or during 
which the actor attempted to kill one or more persons in 
addition to the victim who was killed. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202(1)0)) (2003). According to Mr. 
Ross, the vulnerable language of the statutory text is the 
phrase "act, scheme, course of conduct, or criminal episode." 
Mr. Ross would have us conclude that this phrase is so vague 
that the Constitution renders it void. 
1f 22 We do not reach the merits of Mr. Ross's Eighth 
Amendment vagueness challenge because he does not have 
standing to bring his claim. Like the Fourteenth Amendment, 
the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
Clause prohibits vague statutes, but in this setting the Eighth 
Amendment will intercede only on behalf of defendants who 
face the death penalty. 
If 23 Mr. Ross takes issue with this proposition. His objection, 
despite being off the mark, gives us cause to note the presence 
of two separate strands of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. 
The first, and likely more familiar, is the proportionality 
strand. These cases explore the relationship between offenses 
and the severity of their resulting punishments. See generally 
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Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. IK 20-28. 123 S.Ct. 
1179. 155 L.Ed.2d 108 (2003) (reviewing Supreme Court 
jurisprudence on the proportionality requirement of the 
Eighth Amendment). The second strand of cases looks to the 
Eighth Amendment as a basis upon which to insist that criteria 
used by sentencers to impose the death penalty be employed 
in a discriminating, principled way. The preeminent case in 
this strand is Mavnardv. Cartwright. 486 U.S. 356. 362. 108 
S.Ct. 1853.100 L.Ed.2d 372(1988). It is to this component of 
the Eighth Amendment doctrine that Mr. Ross directs us when 
he challenges the constitutionality of section 76-5-202(1 )(b). 
5 6 11 24 The Eighth Amendment requires that statutory 
aggravators "channel *633 the sentencer's discretion by 
clear and objective standards that provide specific and 
detailed guidance and that make rationally reviewable the 
process for imposing a sentence of death." Godfrey v. 
Georgia. 446 U.S. 420. 428. 100 S.Ct. 1759. 64 L.Ed.2d 
398 (1980) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
Yet, "[t]o meet the standing requirements of Article III, 
'[a] plaintiff must allege personal injury fairly traceable to 
the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be 
redressed by the requested relief.' " Houston v. Roe, 177 
F.3d 901. 907 (9th Cir.1999) (quoting Allen v. Wright. 468 
U.S. 737. 751. 104 S.Ct. 3315. 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984)). 
Further, "[t]he injury must be distinct and palpable not 
merely speculative, and the harm must be imminent and not 
hypothetical." Id. (citing Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 
149. 155. 110 S.Ct. 1717. 109 L.Ed.2d 135 (1990)). In a case 
where the government does not seek the death penalty or 
where the defendant is not sentenced to death, there can be no 
actual or threatened injury caused by vagueness in the death 
penalty statute that is sufficient to justify standing. Id. 
% 25 Our approach to Eighth Amendment challenges to 
Utah's death penalty statute is in harmony with federal 
jurisprudence on the topic as we, too, have denied standing 
to a defendant not sentenced to death who, under the 
Eighth Amendment, sought to challenge the vagueness of 
the aggravating circumstances set out in Utah's death penalty 
statute. State v. Tuttle, 780P.2d 1203. 1215 (Utah 1989). Mr. 
Ross was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility 
of parole. And like the defendant, Mr. Tuttle, Mr. Ross 
lacks standing to challenge the statute under the Eighth 
Amendment. 
U 26 Mr. Ross appears to believe that our conclusion 
that Mr. Tuttle did not have standing because he was not 
sentenced to death was wrong because the United States 
Supreme Court has made the Eighth Amendment available 
to challenge sentences less than death. The Supreme Court 
cases cited by Mr. Ross to make this point are, however, cases 
culled from the proportionality strand of Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence that have nothing to do with the interpretation 
and application of death penalty statutes. 
7 t 27 While standing does not foreclose Mr. Ross's 
remaining due process claims, we find none to be compelling. 
In order to establish that statutes are so vague that they violate 
due process, "a defendant must demonstrate either (1) that 
the statutes do not provide 'the kind of notice that enables 
ordinary people to understand what conduct [is prohibited],' 
or (2) that the statutes 'encourage arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement' " State v. MacGuire, 2004 UT 4.113. 84 P.3d 
1171 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Honie. 2002 UT 
4.t31.57P.3d977): see also Kolender v. Lawson. 461 U.S. 
352. 357.103 S.Ct. 1855. 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983). And where, 
as here, a defendant's claim does not concern an alleged 
infringement of a First Amendment right, the defendant must 
first show that the statute is vague as applied to his conduct, 
before he can attempt to show that the statute is vague in 
all of its applications. State v. Green, 2004 UT 76. Tflf 44. 
45 n. 15. 99 P.3d 820 (citing Hoffman Estates v. Flipside. 
Hoffman Estates. Inc.. 455 U.S. 489.494-95. 102 S.Ct. 1186. 
71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982)). This means that a defendant may 
not complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to others 
if its language affords the defendant adequate notice that his 
conduct was proscribed. Id. 
1128 First, we find that the language of section 76-5-202(1 )(b) 
is sufficiently clear to give Mr. Ross notice that the behavior 
he engaged in was prohibited. The statute provides that a 
murder charge may be increased to aggravated murder if it is 
committed "incident to one act, scheme, course of conduct, 
or criminal episode" where another murder is completed or 
attempted. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202(1 )(b). Although we do 
not concede that the statute requires additional clarification to 
impart sufficient notice on those who might wish to modify 
their conduct to avoid its application, we will nevertheless 
point out several of its most obvious organizing features. 
To trigger section 76-5-202(1 )(b), additional murders or 
their attempts must be related in some way to one another. 
Close temporal proximity is the most apparent measure of 
linkage, as the phrase "incident to one act" suggests. Time 
is not the only possible connecting characteristic, *634 
however, inasmuch as multiple murders or attempts incident 
to one "scheme" may occur over an extended period of time. 
The relevant nexus connoted by "scheme" is a plan that 
targets multiple victims. See State v. Bradshaw, 2006 UT 87. 
TH[ 12-16. 152 P.3d 288 (discussing when multiple related 
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acts may constitute a single scheme in the communications 
fraud context). A single "course of conduct" implies a more 
lengthy duration than an "act" and a lesser emphasis on 
planning than a "scheme," but nevertheless, the term includes 
elements of both act and scheme. One "criminal episode" 
is, like "scheme," not particularly temporally dependent, but 
rather appears to address even otherwise random murders 
or attempts committed while the defendant is undertaking 
another criminal activity. Contrary to what Mr. Ross suggests, 
the terms "act," "scheme," "course of conduct," and "criminal 
episode" have common, generally understood meanings. 
And where statutory terms are "readily ascertainable," the 
vagueness doctrine does not require a legislature to redefine 
them. See MacGuire. 2004 UT 4. ^  31. 84 P.3d 1171. 
% 29 Moreover, the statutory terms acquire greater clarity 
when considered in the context of the whole provision.. 
The individual terms are shaped and their definitional 
contours sharpened through comparisons and contrasts to 
their companions. Thus, the clarity of the whole of the statute 
is greater than the sum of its individual parts. The individual 
terms "act," "scheme," "course of conduct," and "criminal 
episode," taken together in context of the statute, indicate 
a requirement that the foundational act (a murder) and the 
aggravating act (a second murder or an attempted murder) 
be linked by a degree of commonality. Whether time, place, 
manner, purpose, or a combination of the four serve to link 
the foundational act to the aggravating act for the purpose of 
this statute, it is clear that the statute requires that there be 
some indicia that separate acts are parts of a whole. 
U 30 Stated most simply, section 76-5-202(1 )(b) applies to 
murders or attempts linked by time, place, or purpose. It is 
clear to us that the statute would fully communicate to Mr. 
PvOss, as he stood armed with jealous rage and a pistol, waiting 
for Ms. Christensen to answer her door early on the morning 
of June 30, that what could transpire in the ensuing minutes 
could well be crimes and tragedies incident to one criminal 
episode or course of conduct. 
U 31 Mr. Ross killed Ms. Christensen and attempted to 
kill Mr. May in a sequence of events closely linked by 
ail three elements of time, place, and purpose. A simple 
timeline of events illustrates how closely related in time, 
place, and purpose Mr. Ross's actions were: Mr. Ross drove 
to Ms. Christensen's home; he rang the doorbell, entered Ms. 
Christensen's home, and questioned her and Mr. May; he 
forced Ms. Christensen into her bedroom and shot and killed 
her with three bullets; he found Mr. May in the garage, chased 
after him, and fired six bullets, injuring Mr. May with the 
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second shot; he called Ms. Christensen's father, told him that 
he had just killed his daughter, and that he was on his way to 
Mr. Christensen's home to "finish the job"; and finally, while 
still driving, he was apprehended by the police. All of this 
occurred between 6:00 a.m. and 7:00 a.m. 
Tf 32 The trial evidence-most prominently Mr. Ross's 
interrogation of Ms. Christensen regarding the recent sexual 
activity of Ms. Christensen and Mr. May-leaves little doubt 
that Mr. Ross's jealousy and anger over Ms. Christensen's 
spurning of his affections impelled him to appear at Ms. 
Christensen's door. We have little difficulty matching the 
terms "course of conduct" and "criminal episode" to the 
murder and attempted murder that Mr. Ross committed within 
the span of less than one hour, motivated by his jealousy and 
rage. It may be that, at the boundaries, the statute is unclear 
about when two or more separate acts are part of a single 
whole. But this is not a boundary case. The statute, therefore, 
is constitutional as applied to Mr. Ross. 
II. MR. ROSS'S ATTEMPTED AGGRAVATED 
MURDER CONVICTION SHOULD NOT MERGE 
WITH HIS AGGRAVATED MURDER CONVICTION 
Tf 33 We next take up Mr. Ross's claim that the trial court 
committed plain error when it -635 permitted the jury 
to convict him of both aggravated murder and attempted 
aggravated murder, instead of merging the two convictions 
into a single crime. Although I do not hold the majority on 
this issue, I would find that no error occurred because Utah 
Code section 76-5-202 is an enhancement statute; the two 
convictions therefore should not merge. 
If 34 Mr. Ross contends that merger was mandated because 
the attempted murder charge was a necessary predicate to, and 
a lesser included offense of, the aggravated murder charge. 
Utah Code section 76-1-402(3) permits greater and lesser 
included offenses to merge. An offense is "lesser included" 
and eligible for merger when "[i]t is established by proof 
of the same or less than all the facts required to establish 
the commission of the [greater] offense charged...." Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-l-402(3Xa) (2003). We have interpreted this 
provision to mean that "where the two crimes are 'such that 
the greater cannot be committed without necessarily having 
committed the lesser,' then as a matter of law they stand in the 
relationship of greater and lesser offenses, and the defendant 
cannot be convicted or punished for both." State v. Hill, 614 
P.2d 96.97 (Utah 1983) (quoting State v. Baker. 671 P.2d 152. 
156 (Utah 1983)). Although merger is codified in statute, it 
has a constitutional pedigree as it provides a means to prevent 
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violations of constitutional double jeopardy protection. State 
v. Smith. 2005 UT 57.17. 122 P.3d 615. 
TJ 35 A criminal statute is freed from double jeopardy 
concerns and exempted from the merger requirements in 
Utah Code section 76-1-402(3) if it is clear from the "plain 
language and structure" of the pertinent provision that the 
statute is an enhancement statute, i.e., that the legislature 
"intended to enhance the penalty for one type of offense 
when certain characteristics are present that independently 
constitute a different offense." Id. 1f 11. Enhancement statutes 
differ from other criminal statutes by singling out "particular 
characteristics of criminal conduct as warranting harsher 
punishment." Id. ^ 10 (citing State v. McCovev. 803 P.2d 
1234, 1237 (Utah 1990)). But "if the legislature intends 
to preclude [a statute] from requiring merger in a specific 
instance, it must clearly indicate that the provision in question 
is intended to enhance the penalty for one type of offense 
when certain characteristics are present that independently 
constitute a different offense." Id. f 11. 
% 36 In Smith, we held Utah Code section 76-10-504(3) to be 
an enhancement provision because it enhances "the penalty 
for the offense of carrying a concealed firearm when the 
offense is committed in conjunction with a crime of violence, 
a separate offense." Id. *[f 13. We found it relevant that the 
statute enumerated various levels of offenses depending on 
the type of weapon involved and on the circumstances in 
which carrying a concealed weapon occurs. Id. 
f^ 37 Our experience in assessing the characteristics of an 
enhancement statute in Smith serves us well here. While 
Utah Code section 76-5-202 lacks the clear-cut "graduated 
punishment scale" of Utah Code section 76-10-504(3), it 
unmistakably enhances "criminal homicide" to "aggravated 
murder" when the murder is committed in conjunction with . 
one of the several enumerated aggravating circumstances, 
some of which constitute separate, independent crimes. 
Section 76-5-202 does not define aggravated murder by 
setting out a set of elements unique to that offense. Rather, 
the statute provides that murder should be enhanced to 
aggravated murder when a homicide is accompanied by one 
of several listed aggravators. Specifically, the aggravating 
circumstance at issue here requires that murder be enhanced 
to aggravated murder if the murder is committed incident 
to a single "act, scheme, course of conduct, or criminal 
episode ... during which the actor attempted to kill one or 
more persons in addition to the victim who was killed." 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-5-202(1 )(b). The purpose and effect 
of this language-dictated by the plain language and structure 
of the statute-is to enhance the degree of punishment for 
the murder because it was committed in conjunction with 
an attempted murder, a separate offense. Thus, the structure 
of section 76-5-202 demonstrates to our satisfaction that its 
purpose is to single out circumstances that merit a greater 
degree of "636 punishment for murder than that otherwise 
provided for perpetrators of criminal homicide. The statute is, 
therefore, an enhancement statute not subject to the merger 
doctrine. The trial court did not err when it permitted the jury 
to convict Mr. Ross of both aggravated murder and attempted 
aggravated murder. 
U 38 The majority takes issue with this assessment and asserts 
that under Utah Code section 76-1-402(3) the attempted 
murder and the aggravated murder charges against Mr. Ross 
should be merged. Pointing to State v. Shaffer. 725 P.2d 1301 
(Utah 1986). and State v. Wood 868 P.2d 70 (Utah 1993). 
overruled on other grounds by State v. Mirquet, 914 P.2d 
1144 (Utah 1996). the majority contends that this court has 
already found that the merger doctrine applies to Utah Code 
section 76-5-202, the aggravated murder statute. I am neither 
persuaded that we have, nor that we should. 
\ 39 It is true that we held in both Shaffer and Wood that 
the underlying aggravating crime should merge with the 
aggravated murder charge. What we did not discuss in either 
case was whether section 76-5-202 was an enhancement 
statute and, thus, exempt from the merger requirements. In 
Smith, we emphasized the need to determine whether a statute 
was an enhancement statute as a necessary third step in the 
merger analysis: "In McCovey, however, this court in effect 
added a third step to the [merger] analysis, holding that 
in cases where the legislature intended a statute to be an 
enhancement statute, the merger doctrine set forth in section 
76-1-402(3) does not apply." 2005 UT 57. ^ 9. 122 P.3d 
615 (citing McCovev. 803 P.2d at 1237). Because neither 
Shaffer nor Wood mentions section 76-5-202 in the context 
of enhancement, - those cases do not control our decision 
on the enhancement question. And because my decision rests 
on our determination that, under Smith, section 76-5-202 is 
an enhancement statute, I am not troubled by Shaffer's and 
Wood's holdings that section 76-5-202 meets the first two of 
the three steps in a merger analysis. 
III. THE IMPANELING OF AN ANONYMOUS 
JURY DOES NOT REQUIRE A NEW TRIAL 
8 % 40 We next consider whether the trial court committed 
plain error when it impaneled an anonymous jury. We 
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conclude that the trial court was justified in believing it 
confronted a need to protect the jury from media exposure 
and that this concern could be effectively addressed by 
impaneling an anonymous jury. We further conclude that the 
trial court implemented reasonable and workable precautions 
to ensure that Mr. Ross was not prejudiced by the decision to 
refer to jurors by number instead of by name. 
% 41 Our task of considering whether or not it is appropriate 
to impanel an anonymous jury is an issue of first impression 
for this court. The absence of any direction from our appellate 
courts on the subject of anonymous juries is reason enough 
to overcome an unpreserved issue for which review is sought 
based on plain error since a trial court could hardly be faulted 
for failing to take note of jurisprudence that does not exist. 
See State v. Ross. 951 P.2d 236. 239 (Utah CtApp. 1997V 
Still, if the trial judge should have apprehended that by 
impaneling an anonymous jury he would prejudice Mr. Ross 
or if the trial court had impaneled the anonymous jury in a 
manner that resulted in prejudice, we could reach the merits 
and, if appropriate, provide a remedy by invoking the plain 
error exception to our preservation requirement, even in the 
absence of clear Utah precedent on the matter. We do not 
believe that the trial judge plainly erred in this instance. 
But because there is no present guidance for trial courts on 
this question, we take this opportunity first to outline the 
principles that should guide a trial court when faced with the 
issue of whether and how to impanel an anonymous jury and 
then *63 7 to note that this trial judge acted well within those 
parameters. 
f 42 We would not, however, liberally exercise our authority 
to intercede to undo a trial judge's decision to impanel an 
anonymous jury because that decision is highly fact intensive 
and well within the scope of a trial judge's discretionary 
powers. See State v. Samonte, 83 Hawai'i 507. 928 P.2d 
1. 17 (1996). It is a decision that requires a trial judge to 
draw on the training and temperament that form the very 
core of judging and is therefore a decision that is entitled 
to deferential treatment by a reviewing court. See State v. 
Bowles. 530 N.W.2d 521. 531 (Minn. 1995V 
9 10 % 43 Judges properly enjoy considerable latitude 
in conducting the affairs of their courtroom so long as 
courtroom procedures do not communicate bias against the 
defendant. When impaneling an anonymous jury, we deem 
it wise that trial courts exercise their discretion in a manner 
consistent with the approach adopted by the federal courts, 
which includes (1) finding a compelling reason to believe the 
jury needs protection from external sources and (2) taking 
WjMtfljHA/hlovi' (C% 9f?1 1 I *\r\r~\af\r\ £'£*» it a r c Kic\ . ^ a i m ir- rn^nr 
reasonable precautions to minimize any prejudicial effects on 
the defendant and to ensure that the defendant's rights are 
protected. See, e.g., State v. Brown. 280 Kan. 65. 118 P.3d 
1273. 1279 (2005). 
Tf 44 While the trial court in this case did not have the benefit 
of precedent from this court, we believe that it impaneled an 
anonymous jury appropriately and, in fact, adhered closely 
to the principles reflected in these two guidelines. First, the 
trial court had a compelling reason to impanel an anonymous 
jury. Compelling reasons for impaneling an anonymous jury 
include: (1) the defendant's involvement in organized crime; 
(2) the defendant's participation in a group with the capacity to 
harm jurors; (3) the defendant's past attempts to interfere with 
the judicial process; (4) the potential that, if convicted, the 
defendant will suffer a lengthy incarceration and substantial 
monetary penalties; and (5) extensive publicity that could 
enhance the possibility that the jurors' names become public 
and expose them to intimidation or harassment. Id.; see 
also United States v. Ross, 33 F.3d 1507. 1520 (11th 
Cir.1994); United States v, Coonan. 664 F.Supp. 861. 862 
(S.D.N.Y.1987): Samonte. 928 P.2d at 14. 
1f 45 The trial court presiding over Mr. Ross's trial impaneled 
an anonymous jury because of the threat of extensive 
publicity about the case. As our factual narrative amply 
demonstrates, this was a crime that featured an embittered 
ex-lover, a gruesome killing, a suspenseful escape, a police 
chase, and an abundance of other elements that made the trial 
an irresistible media event. The trial court's desire to protect 
the jurors' privacy and its concern about how significant 
media attention might jeopardize the ability of the jury to do 
its work justified its decision to opt for an anonymous jury. 
11 % 46 The trial court also took precautions to mitigate any 
potential prejudice that the defendant might suffer as a result 
of being tried before an anonymous jury. Courts typically 
rely on two general precautions to minimize the prejudicial 
effects of an anonymous jury: (1) ensuring a meaningful 
voir dire to expose bias and (2) offering jury instructions 
designed to eliminate any implication of the defendant's guilt. 
Samonte. 928 P.2d at 13-14: State v. Ford. 539 N.W.2d 214. 
221 (Minn. 1995): Bowles, 530 N.W.2d at 530. The trial court 
here-again unaided by any precedent from this court-took 
each of these precautions to ensure that Mr. Ross was not 
unfairly prejudiced. 
f 47 Effective voir dire, one in which counsel and the 
trial court are able to fully explore and expose bias, is a 
powerful antidote to any prejudice, including that which 
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might result from an anonymous jury. Samonte, 928 P.2d at 
15-16. Ensuring that jury anonymity does not interfere with 
the opportunity to conduct a meaningful voir dire, therefore, 
is critical. 
\ 48 In this case, voir dire was meaningful, with measures 
taken to expose the biases of the jurors. In addition to the jury 
questionnaire, the court asked some follow-up questions in 
private interviews concerning specific answers the potential 
jurors provided in the questionnaires. It asked them about 
their feelings regarding the death penalty and whether they 
"could be fair to both prosecution *638 and defense on 
the issue of punishment." The court informed the jurors that 
"the defendant is presumed innocent and all presumptions 
of law are in favor of his innocence." Finally, it told them 
that "the defendant is never required to prove his innocence." 
This effective voir dire mitigated any prejudice that Mr. Ross 
might have suffered from being tried before an anonymous 
jury-
K 49 To further reduce the risk of prejudice, a trial court 
should instruct jurors in a way that recognizes the threat 
that an anonymous jury poses to a defendant's presumption 
of innocence. This may be accomplished in many ways, 
including, for example, taking care to avoid calling attention 
to the anonymity of the jury or otherwise suggesting that, 
owing to its uniqueness, jury anonymity is reserved for a trial 
of particularly heinous crimes or dangerous and obviously 
guilty defendants. Among instructions emphasizing the 
presumption of innocence, "[t]he trial court should give 
anonymous jurors a plausible and nonprejudicial reason for 
not disclosing their identities that decreases the probability 
that the jurors would infer that the defendant is guilty or 
dangerous." Samonte, 928 P.2d at 16. For example, a court 
might instruct anonymous jurors that "the purpose for juror 
anonymity is to protect the jurors from contacts by the news 
media, thereby implying that juror anonymity is not the result 
of threats from the criminal defendant." Id. 
T| 50 In this case, the trial judge met every reasonable 
expectation we could impose on him to send the jury into 
its deliberations free of any sense that their anonymity 
somehow implied that Mr. Ross was guilty. Specifically, the 
trial court advised the jurors, on more than one occasion, 
that their anonymity was to protect their privacy and 
to encourage their candor during the voir dire process. 
Further, the court explained in its decorum order that 
another purpose of anonymity was to shield the jurors from 
potential media harassment. This order offered jurors a 
plausible and nonprejudicial explanation for why they were 
impaneled anonymously, which reduced the possibility that 
they believed their anonymity was tied to Mr. Ross's guilt or 
dangerous nature. 
1} 51 Additionally, jurors should have known from in-chamber 
interviews that their anonymity was primarily for privacy 
and protection from the media, not from Mr. Ross. With one 
exception, each prospective juror was addressed by both name 
and number during in-chamber interviews. In four different 
interviews, defense counsel referred to prospective jurors by 
name, and the State did so three times. 
% 52 In sum, the trial court did not plainly err in impaneling 
an anonymous jury. It had sufficient cause to do so, including 
the need to protect the jury from the media and to encourage 
candor during the voir dire process. The court also took 
reasonable precautions to minimize prejudicial effects on 
Mr. Ross by ensuring a thorough voir dire process and by 
providing a plausible and nonprejudicial explanation for the 
jurors' anonymity. 
IV. THE STATED REMARKS DID NOT 
CONSTITUTE PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT, 
AND TRIAL COUNSEL'S FAILURE 
TO OBJECT DID NOT CONSTITUTE 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL < 
12 If 53 Finally, we consider whether the State's 
remarks during closing arguments constitute prosecutorial 
misconduct. Applying our plain error standard of review, we 
hold that they do not. Even if the statements made by the State 
during closing arguments were not all fair inferences drawn 
from the evidence proffered during trial, they were harmless 
in the face of the overwhelming evidence of Mr. Ross's guilt. 
Therefore, it was not plain error for the trial court not to have 
intervened when the State stretched evidence regarding the 
only disputed point in the case-whether Mr. Ross's shooting ( 
of Ms. Christensen and Mr. May was incident to "one act, 
scheme, course of conduct, or criminal episode" under Utah 
Code section 76-5-202(1 )(b) (2003). 
13 ^ 54 This court set forth the test for prosecutorial 
misconduct in State v. Valdez, stating: 
*639 The test of whether the remarks made by counsel 
. are so objectionable as to merit a reversal in a criminal 
case is, did the remarks call to the attention of the jurors 
matters which they would not be justified in considering ( 
in determining their verdict, and were they, under the 
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circumstances of the particular case, probably influenced 
by those remarks. 
30 Utah 2d 54. 513 P.2d 422. 426 (1973). This two-part test 
must be applied "under the circumstances of the particular 
case." State v. Troy. 688 P.2d 483. 486 (Utah 1984). In 
assessing the second component of the test, " '[i]f proof 
of defendant's guilt is strong, the challenged conduct or 
remark will not be presumed prejudicial.' " Id. (quoting State 
v. Seeger. 4 Or.App. 336. 479 P.2d 240. 241 (1971)). If 
prosecutorial misconduct is established, the State must show 
that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State 
v. Eaton. 569 P.2d 1114. 1116 (Utah 1977). 
14 15 Tf 55 Our review of a prosecutor's conduct must 
also take into account that "[a] prosecutor has the duty and 
right to argue the case based on the 'total picture shown by 
the evidence or the lack thereof " State v. Hales, 652 P.2d 
1290. 1291 (Utah 1982) (quoting State v. Kazda. 540 P.2d 
949.951 (Utah 1975)). Furthermore, "[qounsei for both sides 
have considerable latitude in their closing arguments. They 
have the right to fully discuss from their perspectives the 
evidence and all inferences and deductions it supports." State 
v. Dibello. 780 P.2d 1221. 1225 (Utah 1989): see also State 
v. Laffertv. 749 P.2d 1239. 1255 (Utah 1988). 
f 56 The State did, in fact, seize a sizeable portion of 
latitude during closing arguments in recounting the events 
surrounding the death of Ms. Christensen. For example, the 
State implied that Mr. Ross ordered both Ms. Christensen 
and Mr. May back to the bedroom, but Mr. May actually 
testified that Mr. Ross only pushed Ms. Christensen toward 
the bedroom. - Also, the State reminded the jury that Mr. 
May said "very few seconds" elapsed between the time when 
Mr. Ross killed Ms. Christensen and when he approached 
Mr. May in the garage and began shooting at him. Mr. May, 
however, gave no specific time frame for the sequence of the 
events.- The jury could infer from these remarks that the 
attempt to kill Mr. May was part of the same "act, scheme, 
course of conduct, or criminal episode" as the murder of 
Ms. Christensen, which was required to convict Mr. Ross of 
aggravated murder. 
f^ 57 While these two remarks were questionable-especially 
considering that they bear on the main issue in the case of 
whether or not Mr. Ross was guilty of murder or aggravated 
murder-they were also harmless given the weight of evidence 
against Mr. Ross. Proof of Mr. Ross's guilt is strong in this 
case. In fact, at trial, Mr. Ross conceded in closing argument 
that he did not dispute the State's evidence and that there was 
not "much doubt, in view of the evidence that [he] killed 
Ms. Christensen, and that he attempted to kill Mr. May." The 
question then became whether "the homicide was committed 
incident to one act, scheme, course of conduct, or criminal 
episode ... during which [Mr. Ross] attempted to kill one or 
more persons in addition to the victim who was killed." Utah 
Code Ann. $76-5-202(1 )(b). 
1158 As we indicated in section I of our analysis, there is ample 
evidence in the record to demonstrate that the murder of 
Ms. Christensen and the attempted murder of Mr. May were, 
indeed, two parts of a single "act, scheme, course of conduct, 
or criminal episode." Specifically, the evidence shows that 
Mr. Ross showed up at Ms. Christensen's *640 home with 
a loaded, concealed handgun. After speaking to both Ms. 
Christensen and Mr. May, Mr. Ross took Ms. Christensen 
into the bedroom and shot her. Mr. Ross proceeded directly 
to the garage, where Mr. May was attempting to flee. Mr. 
Ross chased Mr. May out of the garage and fired six shots at 
him, injuring him with one of the shots. Mr. Ross then called 
Ms. Christensen's father and told him that he had just shot 
his daughter and that he was on his way to Mr. Christensen's 
home to finish the job. The evidence that the murder and 
the attempted murder were part of a single "act, scheme, 
course of conduct, or criminal episode" is strong, even absent 
the questionable statements made by the prosecution in its 
closing arguments. The doctrine of prosecutorial misconduct, 
therefore, does not apply, and it was not plain error for the 
trial court not to have intervened. 
CONCLUSION 
^ 59 In conclusion, we hold that Utah Code section 
76-5-202(1 )(b) is not unconstitutionally vague since the plain 
meaning of the statutory terminology provides sufficient 
notice of the prohibited conduct. We also hold that the 
impaneling of an anonymous jury, under the circumstances 
of this case, does not require a new trial, particularly where 
the trial court took necessary precautions to ensure that 
this procedure was not unfairly prejudicial to Mr. Ross. 
Finally, the State's remarks during closing arguments did 
not constitute prosecutorial misconduct given the weight of 
evidence against Mr. Ross. We therefore affirm Mr. Ross's 
convictions for aggravated murder. The majority finds that 
Mr. Ross's aggravated murder conviction and his attempted 
aggravated murder conviction should merge and vacates his 
attempted aggravated murder conviction. 
y\i&t^iamt4m^r <c> 2f l11 i hnmctnn R A I iters bin r.i»tm fn nrin'mm I i R Qnv/Arnmp.nt Wnrks 11 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
oiaie v. rtoss, i a r.^a ozo \d.\)\)t) 
590 Utah Adv. Rep. 10, 2007 UT 89 
% 60 Associate Chief Justice WILKINS concurs in Justice 
NEHRING's opinion. 
DURHAM. Chief Justice, writing for the majority: 
16 1| 61 According to this court's precedent, an underlying 
felony that constitutes the aggravating circumstance merges 
with the conviction for aggravated murder pursuant to Utah 
Code section 76-5-202. Therefore, it was impermissible 
for the trial court to allow convictions to stand for both 
aggravated murder and attempted aggravated murder when 
the attempted murder of Mr. May was the only aggravating 
factor presented to the jury. 
17 TJ 62 Aggravated murder, a capital crime, "requires proof 
of a statutorily defined aggravating circumstance in addition 
to an intentional and knowing killing." State v. Shaffer, 725 
P.2d 1301. 1313 (Utah 1986). In the instant case, the sole 
aggravating circumstance presented to the jury was whether 
"the homicide was committed incident to one act, scheme, 
course of conduct, or criminal episode ... during which the 
actor attempted to kill one or more persons in addition to the 
victim who was killed." Utah Code Ann. S 76-5-202(1 )(b) 
(2003). Proof of the attempted murder of Mr. May served 
as the aggravating circumstance allowing for Mr. Ross's 
conviction for capital murder. 
^ 63 The merger doctrine, derived from the Fifth 
Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause, prevents a defendant 
from being convicted of "both the offense charged and the 
included offense." Utah Code Ann. 8 76-1-402(3) (2003 & 
Supp.2007). An offense is included when "[i]t is established 
by proof of the same or less than all the facts required 
to establish the commission of the offense charged." Id. § 
76-1-402(3 )(a). In the case before us, where the attempted 
murder of Mr. May was the sole aggravating factor presented 
to the jury, the attempted murder is a lesser included offense 
of the aggravated murder. Proof of the facts of the attempted 
murder were necessary to establish the commission of the 
aggravated murder. 
If 64 On more than one occasion, this court has determined 
that the merger doctrine applies to Utah Code section 
76-5-202. In State v. Shaffer, we held that aggravated robbery 
merged with aggravated murder when robbery was the sole 
aggravating circumstance for the capital murder conviction. 
725 P.2d at 1313. Similarly, in State v. Wood, we held that 
the predicate offense of aggravated sexual assault merged 
with the conviction for aggravated murder. *641 868 P.2d 
70. 90 (Utah 1993). overmled on other grounds by State v. 
Mirauet 914 P.2d 1144 (Utah 1996V1 Since Shaffer and 
Wood were decided, the legislature has not modified the 
provisions of Utah Code section 76-5-202 in any manner 
that would alter our analysis. Compare Utah Code Ann. § 
76-5-202 (2003). with id g 76-5-202 (Supp.1993), and id 
§ 76-5-202 (Supp. 1986). Although the legislature has added 
new aggravating factors and affirmative defenses, it has done 
nothing to "clearly indicate that the provision... is intended to 
enhance the penalty for [murder] when certain characteristics 
are present." State v. Smith 2005 UT 57. f 11. 122 P.3d 
615. We have previously stated that such explicit indication 
is required, id., and the legislature has had ample opportunity 
to exempt aggravated murder from the doctrine of merger 
by amending the statute to clearly indicate that it is intended 
to operate only as an enhancement provision. "[T]he court 
has no power to rewrite a statute to make it conform to an 
intention not expressed." State v. McCovey, 803 P.2d 1234. 
1240 (Utah 1990) (Durham, J., dissenting) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). Absent action by the legislature, Shaffer and 
Wood are still good law, and the dissent's effort to read section 
76-5-202 as an enhancement statute is improper absent clear 
legislative action. -
Tf 65 The aggravating circumstance in this case was the 
attempted murder. Like the predicate felonies in Shaffer and 
Wood, when the aggravating circumstance is a crime, it must 
merge with the greater offense if no other independent ground 
exists to raise the charge to aggravated murder. - To allow 
the attempted murder charge to be used as the sole means of 
aggravation and as its own separate offense permits double 
counting of the offense in violation of double jeopardy and 
the merger doctrine. 
1f 66 Mr. Ross could have been convicted of murder and 
attempted murder. When the jury convicted Mr. Ross for 
aggravated murder, the attempted murder of Mr. May, a 
necessary element to prove the aggravated murder, merged 
with the capital felony. Accordingly, Mr. Ross could be 
convicted of only aggravated murder. 
1} 67 We affirm the conviction for aggravated murder and 
vacate the conviction for attempted aggravated murder. The 
practical effect of this decision is that Mr. Ross will serve 
one life sentence without the possibility of parole instead of 
two. See State v. Hill. 61A P.2d 96. 98 (Utah 1983) ("[I]t is 
appropriate to regard the conviction on the lesser offense as 
mere surplusage, which does not invalidate the conviction and 
sentence on the greater offense."). 
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K 68 Justice DURRANT and Justice PARRISH concur in
 P a r a i i e i citations 
Chief Justice DURHAM'S opinion. 
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Footnotes 
1 We decided Shaffer before we added the third step in the merger analysis in McCovey. And in Wood, which was decided 
after McCovey but before we further clarified our McCovey holding in Smith, the question of whether section 76-5-202 was an 
enhancement statute was not raised as an issue and we, consequently, did not discuss it. 
2 In closing arguments, the State said, "[Mr. Ross] doesn't order just [Ms. Christensen] back to that bedroom. He orders Mr. May back 
to the bedroom as well. He starts them back to the bedroom." Mr. May actually testified that Mr. Ross grabbed Ms. Christensen's arm 
and pushed her toward the bedroom. After another exchange, Mr. Ross pushed past Mr. May and, again, pushed Ms. Christensen 
to the bedroom. 
3 Although Mr. May said that he heard the shots that killed Ms. Christensen while he was trying to start his car and that "the next 
thing I noticed I was looking up and there he was right in the doorway," he never testified that "very few seconds" elapsed. 
1 In Wood, the aggravating circumstance that the murder was heinous and depraved was not treated as a separate aggravating 
circumstance because "the heinousness and depravity arose directly out of the aggravated sexual assault.... [T]he heinousness and 
the [sexual assault] were the same factually and should be treated legally for merger purposes as one aggravating circumstance." 
868 P.2d at 90. 
2 Even absent our precedent, the aggravated murder statute does not evidence a "graduated punishment scale ... indicative of an 
enhancement statute." Smith, 2005 UT 57, T[ 3, 122 P.3d 615 (internal quotation marks omitted). In Smith, the concealed weapon 
statute at issue listed circumstances in which carrying a concealed weapon could be either a class B misdemeanor, a class A 
misdemeanor, or a second degree felony. Id. ^ 12. The structure of section 76-5-202 is unlike that at issue in Smith; all aggravated 
murders are capital felonies. 
3^  See State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327, 367 (Utah 1993) (recognizing that a "defendant could be convicted of a crime that might also serve 
as the basis for an aggravating circumstance if the prosecution did not rely on that crime for proof of the aggravating circumstance," 
and on that basis holding that the theft conviction did not merge with the first degree murder conviction under Utah Code section 
76-5-202). 
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FILED 
OCT 0 7 2009 
SECOND 
DISTRICT COURT 
IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT, DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
TRO VON DONTA ROSS, 
D^^^^x**,-.-^ 
X C U U ' - ' H U ; 
VS. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent. 
RULING ON RESPONDENT'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 
PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR 
DEFAULT 
Case No. 080700641 
Judge Rodney S. Page 
COMES NOW the Court on the respondent's motion for summary judgment and the 
petitioner's motion for default. Having reviewed the moving and responding papers, and the 
materials submitted in support thereof, determined that a hearing is unnecessary for the Court's 
rulings, and being fully advised in the premises, the Court GRANTS the respondent's motion for 
summary judgment and DENIES the petitioner's motion for default. 
BACKGROUND 
On October 24, 2004, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to 
the Utah Post-Conviction Remedies Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78B-9-101 et seq. and Rule 65C of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. However, the petitioner did not submit a supporting 
memorandum detailing the factual basis and legal argument relevant to the claims within his 
petition. Instead, the petitioner filed a motion for discovery. Subsequently, on November 6, 
2008, and following a review of the petitioner's affidavit and application for waiver of fees 
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submitted concurrent with his petition, the Court found the petitioner indigent and provided him 
with notice of the initial partial filing fee associated with the filing of his petition. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 78A-2-306(l). The Court also notified the petitioner that it could not proceed with his 
petition until he paid the assessed initial partial filing fee. See Id, at § 78A-2-306(2). 
On November 28, 2008, the Court received the petitioner's initial partial filing fee, but 
still had not received the petitioner's supporting memorandum. Thereafter, on January 5, 2009, 
the Court again informed the petitioner that it would not proceed in reviewing his petition for 
frivolity, pursuant to Rule 65C(g) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, until receiving his 
supporting memorandum. In response, the petitioner filed a second motion for discovery on 
January 22, 2009. This motion prompted the Court to issue a ruling on January 29, 2009, which 
denied the petitioner's motions for discovery, finding that such motions were premature under 
Rule 65C(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. On the same day, the Court also entered a 
i 
finding of deficiency regarding the petitioner's claims and directed him to file an amended 
statement of facts and supporting memorandum. See Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(g)(3). Thereafter, on 
February 3, 2009, the petitioner filed a memorandum in support of his petition, and on February 
11,2009, the petitioner filed an amended statement of facts regarding his post-conviction claims. 
Accordingly, the Court reviewed the petition for post-conviction relief and its supporting 
materials for frivolity, pursuant to Rule 65C(g) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. < 
On April 9, 2009, the Court issued an order of partial dismissal and requiring 
respondent's pleading, pursuant to Rule 65C(i) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Within this 
I 
order, the Court noted that it had reviewed the petition for post-conviction relief, the amended 
statement of facts and the petitioner's supporting memorandum, and, without reaching the merits 
of the petitioner's claims, determined that each of the claims appeared frivolous on their face ^ 
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with the exception of the petitioner's claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate 
counsel pertaining to an alleged failure to raise the "extreme emotional distress" affirmative 
defense to aggravated murder set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202(4) (2002).! Specifically, 
the Court grouped the petitioner's several claims into four (4) categories: (1) claims of 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel; (2) claims of prosecutorial misconduct at trial; (3) claims 
for violation of double jeopardy; and (4) claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. 
Based on the materials submitted by the petitioner, which included a copy of the Utah Supreme 
Court ruling on his direct appeal, see State v. Ross, 174 P.3d 628 (Utah 2007), the Court found 
that with the aforementioned exceptions the petitioner's claims clearly appeared frivolous on 
their face, as the claims were either raised or addressed at trial or on appeal, or could have been 
but were not raised at trial or on appeal.2 The Court then directed the respondent to file a 
responsive pleading to the petitioner's two (2) surviving claims. 
Subsequently, on April 23, 2009, the petitioner filed a motion to appoint counsel. The 
Court denied this motion by written ruling dated April 24, 2009, finding that under the 
circumstances the motion was premature, as the Post-Conviction Remedies Act contemplates the 
necessity of an evidentiary hearing before the Court determines whether counsel is necessary for 
1
 In 2009, the Utah State Legislature amended Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202(4) by deleting subsection (i), which 
stated in relevant part the affirmative defense: "under the influence of extreme emotional distress for which there is 
a reasonable explanation or excuse." The current version of the statute provides an affirmative defense based on: "a 
reasonable belief that the circumstances provided a legal justification or excuse for the conduct although the conduct 
was not legally justifiable or excusable under the existing circumstances." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202(4) (2009). 
The Court notes that the petitioner's claims at issue pertain to the version of the statute applicable at the time of his 
trial in 2004. Accordingly, this Ruling's references to § 76-5-202(4) pertain to the 2002 version of the statute, not 
the statute's 2009 version. 
2
 See Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(g); see also Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-106(l); see also Hutchings v. State, 84 P.3d 1150, 
1152-53 (Utah 2003) ("Section [78B-9-106(l)] precludes a petitioner from seeking relief on any ground that was 
raised or addressed at trial or on appeal or that could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal. ... 
Proceedings in all petitions for relief filed under the Post Conviction Remedies Act are governed by rule 65 C of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 65C contemplates section [78B-9-106] by providing for summary dismissal of 
claims that have already been addressed by the court. Subparagraph (g)(1) of the rule directs the assigned judge to 
review the petition, and if it is apparent to the court that any claim has been adjudicated in a prior proceeding, or if 
any claim appears frivolous on its face, the court shall forthwith issue an order dismissing the claim . . . . Proceedings 
on the claim shall terminate with the entry of the order of dismissal.") (Emphasis in original) (Internal quotations 
and citations omitted). 
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the proper adjudication of a petitioner's claims.3 The Court, however, granted the petitioner leave 
to renew his motion to appoint counsel at a more appropriate time in the proceedings. 
Then, on July 13, 2009, and following the Court's granting two (2) requests for 
extensions of time, the respondent served its motion for summary judgment. In its accompanying 
supporting memorandum, the respondent argued that the petitioner's surviving claim for 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel is procedurally barred, as the petitioner could have raised 
the claim on appeal. See Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(g); see also Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-106(l)(c). 
The respondent asserted that because the petitioner's appellate counsel was not the same as his 
trial counsel and because the trial record was adequate to determine whether his trial counsel was 
ineffective, the petitioner could have raised the issue of the "extreme emotional distress" 
affirmative defense on direct appeal. Further, the respondent argued that the petitioner's claim 
for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel must also fail, as the trial record clearly shows that 
the petitioner's trial counsel's decision not to raise the affirmative defense was strategic and 
specifically agreed to by the petitioner. Accordingly, the respondent requested the Court dismiss 
the petitioner's surviving claims. 
On July 28, 2009, the petitioner filed a memorandum in opposition to the respondent's 
motion for summary judgment. In his opposition, the petitioner asserted that he was never 
informed of the affirmative defense within Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202(4), and was told that his 
mental evaluations would not support the same. Despite the inconsistency of these assertions, the 
petitioner argued that review of his mental evaluations is necessary to determine whether his trial 
counsel was ineffective. The petitioner next reasserted the argument that his appellate counsel 
3
 See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-109; see also State v. Ford, 199 P.3d 892, 896 (Utah 2008) ("The Act indicates such 
appointment should occur at the request of the petitioner, and where an evidentiary hearing would be required or the 
petition involves complicated issues of law or fact that require the assistance of counsel for proper adjudication."J 
(Emphasis added) (Internal quotations omitted). 
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was ineffective for failing to raise the issue of his trial counsel's ineffectiveness regarding the 
affirmative defense. Further, the petitioner averred that the respondent's reliance on the trial 
record regarding his counsel's strategic decision to not raise the affirmative defense is misplaced. 
The petitioner asserted that the "extreme emotional distress" affirmative defense discussed by his 
trial counsel on the record is not the same as that contained in the 2009 version of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-202(4), which he argued is relevant to the surviving claims within his petition.4 
Accordingly, the petitioner argued that the respondent's motion is unresponsive. 
Also on July 28, 2009, the petitioner filed a motion for default regarding the timeliness of 
the respondent's motion for summary judgment. In his motion, the petitioner argued that the 
respondent had untimely submitted its motion. The petitioner asserted that the Court's extension 
of time for the respondent to submit its response to the petitioner's surviving claims ended July 
12, 2009. Accordingly, the petitioner averred that because the respondent's motion for summary 
judgment was not served until July 13, 2009, the respondent's pleading was untimely and must 
be disregarded. 
On August 4, 2009, the respondent filed a memorandum in opposition to the petitioner's 
motion for default. In its opposition, the respondent argued that the Utah Post-Conviction 
Remedies Act does not permit judgments by default against the State of Utah, but rather requires 
4
 The Court notes that the petitioner's opposing memorandum attempts to confuse the substance of his surviving 
claims. The petition for post-conviction relief and its supporting memorandum both asserted claims for ineffective 
assistance of counsel for failing to raise the affirmative defense of "extreme emotional distress". See Petition for 
Post-Conviction Relief of an Illegal Conviction, pg.4, \ C; see also Memorandum in Support of 65C Petition, pgs. 
12, 16-17, 42-43, 49-50. The petitioner's claims for ineffective assistance of counsel regarding this defense are the 
claims for which the Court required the respondent's pleading, not the alternative manslaughter affirmative defense 
that the petitioner incorrectly references in his opposing memorandum. See Order of Partial Dismissal and Requiring 
Respondent's Pleading. The Court notes that a petitioner's attempt to reconfigure his claims in an opposing 
memorandum is generally an impermissible tactic, unless good cause is shown. See State v. Lafferty, 175 P.3d 530, 
541 (Utah 2007); see also Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(c). Here, the Court finds that the petitioner has not demonstrated 
good cause to reconfigure his petition's surviving claims to pertain to the alternative manslaughter affirmative 
defense. Indeed, both the trial and appellate court records and the materials submitted by the parties clearly do not 
support a defense based upon "a reasonable belief that the circumstances provided a legal justification or excuse for 
the conduct although the conduct was not legally justifiable or excusable under the circumstances." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-5-202(4) (2009). 
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a petitioner to establish a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome in light of the facts 
proved in the post-conviction proceeding. Regardless, however, the respondent asserted that July 
12, 2009, was a Sunday and that service of its motion for summary judgment on the following 
Monday, July 13, 2009, constitutes a timely submission under Rule 6(a) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. Accordingly, the respondent requested the Court deny the petitioner's motion 
for default. 
On August 13, 2009. the respondent filed a request to submit for decision regarding its 
motion for summary judgment. 
ANALYSIS 
As a preliminary matter, the Court shall address the merits of the petitioner's motion for 
default regarding the timeliness of the respondent's motion for summary judgment. 
Rule 65C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides in relevant part: 
"Within 30 days (plus time allowed under these rules for service by mail) 
after service of a copy of the petition upon the respondent, or within such 
other period of time as the court may allow, the respondent shall answer or 
otherwise respond to the portions of the petition that have not been 
dismissed and shall serve the answer or other response upon the petitioner 
in accordance with Rule 5(b)." 
Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(i) (Emphasis added). Further, Rule 6 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides in relevant part: 
"When by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by order of the 
court an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a specified time, 
the court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion ... with or 
without motion or notice order the period enlarged if request therefor is 
made before the expiration of the period originally prescribed or as 
extended by a previous order[.]" 
Id. at 6(b). Moreover, Rule 6 also provides that: 
"The last day of the period so computed shall be included, unless it is a 
Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday, in which event the period runs 
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until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal 
holiday." 
Id. at 6(a) (Emphasis added). 
Here, the Court issued its order requiring the respondent's pleading on April 9, 2009. 
This order directed the respondent to file its response within thirty (30) days of its issuance. 
Subsequently, on May 15, 2009, the respondent filed a motion for enlargement of time regarding 
its response based upon a delay in its receipt of the record and transcripts from the petitioner's 
trial. The Court found good cause in the respondent's motion and granted the same by order 
dated May 18, 2009. This order extended the time for the respondent's pleading to thirty (30) 
days after the respondent's receipt of the trial record and transcripts. The respondent received the 
trial record and transcripts on May 28, 2009. Subsequently, on July 6, 2009, the respondent filed 
a second motion for enlargement of time regarding its responsive pleading based upon caseload 
issues. On July 7, 2009, the Court issued an order granting the respondent's second motion for 
enlargement of time, finding that good cause existed for the same and permitted the respondent 
until July 12, 2009, to submit its responsive pleadings. Thereafter, the respondent served its 
motion for summary judgment on Monday, July 13, 2009. 
Based on the foregoing timeline, considered in the context of the language of Rules 6 and 
65C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court finds that the respondent's service of its 
motion for summary judgment on Monday, July 13, 2009, was a timely response to the surviving 
claims within the petition for post-conviction relief. Accordingly, the Court DENIES the 
petitioner's motion for default. 
Having now determined that the respondent's motion for summary judgment was timely 
submitted, the Court shall address the merits of such motion. 
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Summary judgment is appropriate only, "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). As discussed herein above, the petitioner has raised two 
(2) claims that survived dismissal for frivolity and the respondent has moved for summary 
judgment on each of these claims. The Court shall address each of the petitioner's surviving 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims in turn: 
1. The petitioner has failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact to preclude 
summary judgment on his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise 
the "extreme emotional distress" affirmative defense to aggravated murder set forth 
in Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202(4). 
The Utah Post-Conviction Remedies Act provides that any claims that a petitioner raised 
or could have raised on direct appeal are procedurally barred. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-
106(1). "Indeed, 'a petition for post-conviction relief is a collateral attack of a conviction and/or 
sentence and is not a substitute for direct appellate review/" Loose v. State, 135 P.3d 886, 889 
(Utah Ct. App. 2006) (quoting Myers v. State, 94 P.3d 211,214 (Utah 2004)). 
Here, the petitioner has argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the 
affirmative defense to aggravated murder set forth at Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202(4) regarding 
"extreme emotional distress". "[Ineffective assistance of [trial] counsel should be raised on 
[direct] appeal if [1] the trial record is adequate to permit decision of the issue and [2] defendant 
is represented by counsel other than trial counsel." State v. Litherland, 12 P.3d 92, 96 (Utah 
2000^ (Internal Quotations omitted). 
In the instant matter, it is undisputed that the petitioner was represented on his direct 
appeal by counsel other than his trial counsel. Thus, the Court finds that the second factor for 
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determining whether a claim could have been raised on direct appeal is clearly met with regard to 
the petitioner's first claim. 
Moreover, with regard to the first factor, "[a] party to an appeal in a criminal case may 
move the court to remand the case to the trial court for entry of findings of fact, necessary for the 
appellate court's determination of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel" Utah R. App. P. 
23B(a). The existence of Rule 23B of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure ensures that the 
petitioner's appellate court would have had a sufficient record to adjudicate any viable claim of 
ineffective assistance of the petitioner's trial counsel. See Litherland, 12 P.3d at 98-99 ("[Where, 
on direct appeal, defendant raises a claim that trial counsel was ineffective .... defendant bears 
the burden of assuring the record is adequate. This holding merely clarifies the effect of rule 
23B. ... Where the record appears inadequate in any fashion, ambiguities or deficiencies 
resulting therefrom simply will be construed in favor of a finding that counsel performed 
effectively.") (Emphasis in original). Indeed, in this matter the petitioner raised claims of 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel on his direct appeal. See Ross, 174 P.3d at 638-640. Thus, 
the Court finds that the first requirement for determining whether a claim could have been raised 
on direct appeal is also clearly met with regard to the petitioner's first claim. 
The Court, therefore, finds that the petitioner could have brought his claim of ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel regarding his counsel's failure to raise the affirmative defense of 
"extreme emotional distress" on direct appeal. Accordingly, the Court must GRANT the 
respondent's motion for summary judgment on the petitioner's first claim, as such claim is 
procedurally barred as a matter of law by Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-106(l)(c) and Rule 65C(g)(l) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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However, the Utah Post-Conviction Remedies Act provides that an individual may seek 
relief on the basis that a claim could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal "if the 
failure to raise that ground was due to ineffective assistance of counsel." Utah Code Ami. § 78B-
9-106(3). Accordingly, for this exception to the procedural bar to apply, the petitioner must 
demonstrate that the failure to raise a claim on direct appeal was due to the ineffective assistance 
of appellate counsel. See Lafferty, 175 P.3d at 540-42. This leads the Court to consider the 
petitioner's second claim, which relates to an alleged ineffective assistance of the petitioner's 
appellate counsel for failing to raise issue with regard to the effectiveness of the petitioner's trial 
counsel for not presenting the "extreme emotional distress" affirmative defense. 
2. The petitioner has failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact to preclude 
summary judgment on his claim that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to 
raise issue with the effectiveness of trial counsel with regard to the "extreme 
emotional distress" affirmative defense to aggravated murder set forth in Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-202(4). 
To demonstrate ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, a petitioner must establish: (1) 
his attorneys' performance was deficient and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced his case. 
See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Given these requirements, the Utah Supreme 
Court has indicated that, "[a] post-conviction petitioner can show that his appellate counsel was 
ineffective by showing that appellate counsel prejudiced his case by omitting a claim that is a 
dead-bang-winner." Taylor v. State, 156 P.3d 739, 746 (Utah 2007) (Internal quotations omitted). 
"This requires the petitioner to show that appellate counsel [1] omitted an issue which is obvious 
from the trial record and [2] one which probably would have resulted in reversal on appeal" Id. 
(Internal quotations omitted) (Emphasis added). 
Here, the petitioner has argued that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to 
raise issue with his trial counsel's effectiveness regarding the "extreme emotional distress" 
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affirmative defense. While the petitioner has correctly framed his argument as a claim of 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, thus avoiding the procedural bar of the Post-
Conviction Remedies Act, his argument ignores controlling case law regarding ineffective 
assistance of counsel and the clear trial record in this matter. 
First, under the standard set for by the Utah Supreme Court in Taylor, any claim that the 
petitioner's trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the "extreme emotional distress" 
affirmative defense, must be obvious from the trial record. See 156 P.3d at 746; see also Lafferty, 
175 P.3d at 539. In this regard, it is noteworthy that, "[a] fair assessment of attorney performance 
requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight... and to 
evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. A 
petitioner must "rebut the strong presumption that under the circumstances, the challenged action 
might be considered sound trial strategy." Litherland, 12 P.3d at 99 (Internal quotations omitted). 
"Court[s] will not second-guess trial counsel's legitimate strategic choices, however flawed those 
choices might appear in retrospect." State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461, 465 (Utah Ct App 1993). 
Here, the trial record conclusively demonstrates that the petitioner's trial counsel's 
decision not to raise the "extreme emotional distress" affirmative defense was not only strategic, 
but was specifically agreed to by the petitioner. On November 8, 2004, after closing arguments 
in the petitioner's trial, and with the jury in deliberation, the Court held a conference in chambers 
with counsel and the petitioner present. See Reporter's Transcript, Proceedings (In Chambers), 
Trial Volume 5 of 6 (Nov. 8, 2004). During this conference, the petitioner's counsel explained 
that he did not present the "extreme emotional distress" affirmative defense as part of his trial 
strategy due to evidentiary problems known to himself and the petitioner. Id. at pg. 20, In. 6-25; 
pg. 21, In. 1-23. Specifically, the petitioner's trial counsel stated: 
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"There is, your honor, and - and it's a matter I think should be put on the 
record. 
Mr. Ross and I have talked about this, but as to the matter of strategy 
that was in this case -- and I think it's important maybe for later on down 
the road. 
Basically, Mr. -- Mr. — when I represented — started representing Mr. 
Ross we spoke ~ / spoke with the county attorney and there was an offer 
made. If Mr. Ross would plead guilty, he would receive life without parole. 
Mr. Ross and I discussed that. It was his decision that he did not want life 
without parole, that — that he, in fact, desired the death penalty. 
And I instructed him at that point that even if he pled guilty -- and there 
was a question of whether or not there could be an admission — evidence 
problems in taking that guilty pica of Mr. Ross - giving that guilty plea. 
But in the event the guilty plea was accepted, I explained to him that 
there would still be the necessity of a hearing, a sentencing hearing, that 
the judge can not impose the death penalty without that hearing. 
And I advised him, Mr. Ross, that if that was his position then it was to 
his benefit to have a trial because, basically, the same evidence would be 
introduced at the sentencing hearing as a trial. And if he had the trial, that 
would keep his options open, not only for possible appeal down the road, 
but also for his testimony at the penalty phase of the hearing. 
I think the court can question Mr. Ross, but Mr. Ross was in agreement 
with that strategy. I think we followed through with that strategy. There 
was no manslaughter defense raised based on any extreme emotional 
disturbance because of- because of evidentiary? problems as are known to 
Mr. Ross and myself 
But anyway, that strategy has been followed and I think if there is a 
penalty phase, Mr. Ross will testify: And I think once that happens, what 
he testifies to is revealed, I think well -- we'll show the — the 
reasonableness of that strategy. And so I just wanted to put that on the 
record in case down the road, who knows what will happen. 
But anyway, that's the reason I've done what I've done. 1 think Mr. Ross 
~ he and I have talked about this a lot, on numerous occasions, and I 
think he agrees with that strategy. So I'd like to put that on the record." 
Id. (Emphasis added). Following these statements, the Court inquired with the petitioner as to 
whether the referenced conversations and trial strategy decisions were discussed and agreed to. 
Id. at pg. 21, In. 24-25; pg. 22, In. 1. To this inquiry, the petitioner responded: "Yes, your honor." 
Id. at pg. 22, In. 2 (Emphasis added). 
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Given the statements of the petitioner's trial counsel and the petitioner within the trial 
record regarding the strategic decision not to raise the "extreme emotional distress" affirmative 
defense, and the strong presumption given to trial strategies, the Court finds that a claim for 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel based upon the failure of counsel to raise the affirmative 
defense would not have been obvious from the trial record at the petitioner's direct appeal. 
Accordingly, the Court finds that the petitioner cannot satisfy the first prong of his ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel claim. 
Moreover, because the petitioner's trial counsel's decision to not raise the affirmative 
defense was strategic, the petitioner must set forth facts and argument to rebut the strong 
presumption of effectiveness regarding this decision to satisfy the second prong of his ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel claim, i.e. that the claim probably would have resulted in reversal 
on appeal. See Taylor, 156 P.3d at 746; see also Lafferty, 175 P.3d at 539. In reviewing the 
pleadings and supporting materials submitted by the petitioner, the Court finds that the petitioner 
has not met his burden with respect to this second prong. This is not the case of the failure to 
raise a "dead-bang-winner." 
Accordingly, in failing to establish his trial counsel's ineffectiveness, the petitioner has 
not established such obvious error, as is required under Taylor and Lafferty to render his 
appellate counsel's failure to raise such issue on appeal constitutionally ineffective. See 156 P.3d 
at 746; see also 175 P.3d at 539 "Proof of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be a 
speculative matter but must be a demonstrable reality." State v. Penman, 964 P.2d 1157, 1162 
(Utah Ct. App. 1998) (citing Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870, 877 (Utah 1993)). Therefore, 
because the petitioner has not met his burden of establishing his ineffective assistance of 
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appellate counsel claim, the Court must GRANT the respondent's motion for summary judgment 
on the petitioner's second claim. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon a careful consideration of all the pleadings in this case, and the materials 
submitted in support thereof, the Court finds that the petitioner has failed to "set forth specific 
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial" with respect to each of the claims he raises. 
See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e). Accordingly, the Court finds that the respondent is entitled to 
summary judgment on each of the petitioner's claims as a matter of law. The Court, therefore, 
GRANTS the respondent's motion for summary judgment and shall dismiss the petitioner's 
petition for post-conviction relief. Further, and as discussed herein above, the Court DENIES the 
petitioner's motion for default. 
Pursuant to Rule 7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court directs the 
respondent to prepare an appropriate order that is consistent with and reflects this Ruling. 
Date signed: Dr^ 7 , 3lCCf\ • 
$&.:... J- 6, 
DISTRICTSOURT JUDGE 
RODNEY S. PAGE 
v. #&. *&-*? 
^^as^r-S 1* 
Page 14 0U0366 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Addendum E 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
P-O&e* 9 TO 
JUL 2 8 2009 
SECOND 
^ j>\ DISTRICT COURT 






: C / > 
c 3 3 
/ ^ 7 > TV/^ve.






•Oit-e/^-e. ^ e ^ v ^ S v / ^ ^ <• 
/ 
"7^7*3 S?v^s*n*t> &** t-c&^m, f-J T4* £ W ^ & 
. - la _^^-« / * r>~* 6p 
** r 
i 
/2„/^ <5% &r,*z~fsu.fi 
*S 
/7-7 S*Z£:*sZc->* 
C ^ 2J J*"**** <S> 7&*£**£c **rj J 
f~/&S7~y ,T^t&7~ rzs^s C/t&s*?-} *? s?> f. j€4F*9T.**r?-u-e> 
iZU* / i-e-C-r &-n^ *TIffl^e*--** j 
0 
M '- /ef 0 
£/& 00033D 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
/ ' A&u**- /&>'jrj&r^^j£>+~^rz £?/<&**r*r? /%9 TVttsHZ-SL ^T^C^P 
&2*&?^^'^—' cr^< /Z&*r&>-*.e/t >x* ** •TJPVW-/ STTZ^rrp 
•^z. 
<Q <- sz<?^ ^ZJ rU<e*r- S2*z*>or <ZL 
>€>c r~*r~<?^g_ e»>~r?& r?s-i^tj? &fi''sj~**,* h*.+-t<. " 
>^?r» ^7 S *>i~+~eJP sTtl^J)^ C^cJ* sX*T 7^^ 
. / T W V ^ ^ /&fs?c~*&~*r £>&*, ^ V ^ ^ ^ - ^ z a £y~ 
£"s?--o -r? 'sy^i/*
 <z3l2'S-jZ"e fitxr-r-n <&<£ >£<~~S. *> J"^t *0&T~ *~*4*SL&-
WP $. &/<&*^t_4?c/'s S^fZ- A**/cJ? /£*=, S^> &'?<&£**'-. 
b-eJ*<j>y &sz~ /Zer.sy^rLesz.^, 
C'£?sJ~*i>~ !~J?G <„ sz*s>/*JP •}-& h-e T^- s~$si**> £-.?<:.£ 
si * ' y -
//y\^V^^ SS5 £^-eJP jQ/Sf+tr SS'C-*<s 
7 ^ "n7«^J,~fA~* */*/£-** " *Cr<Se~JZ-r*' . . U U 0 3 3 6 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
•s 1?r3 
• &ffis*^ r*> *>*e &•*fy f~K *x->. / j £/ryr& (^Jr 
/$*5 7T> T&t&L Ccn^KjS&C-
/2er?T>e'i*s2- IOAS • **ec*e<c.- S+j£x**~e*^ ^c &*+-Scf &&> 
\ 7 ^ 7 / s^tr/t^r-t-
 y & i ^ > / zJ^f *7» c-0 T^e **?-A~***S 
\.. <^d&.lcl&r>«^S WOcs/d3 /Oc,7- Zt~ff>C"Z7-~ ^5~* 
• I . • • ' • ' • • • ' . • ' ' . 
£#0 7 < /<ne^~>m^/ ^&L><xr* i-c&r^A^s S«£-c^ . /^.T^TJ^W-^C 
*j*.r O^f-*-**^; trrt cPo T&^ s&y ^e *J*S ***-c*ksz 
f&is/kr'sL-j /?tUcSja~cP $4&*J<^ •o/fcj &-e 
(Jvr7/ y^c^f &&s<tyzc£r C*~> &-e /Zeis t •<&***#, • 
/2&7>T?&**i- «S. 5 £A**^5 T^i^T &r>^}*/r>ri-> frJlS
 /^>c^f~ 
sn e*^<& s ITV /e/ /;>-? k<y <£rs <?***<>-*-£•/y h**-T 
6-e tO# K-,rr? ?~V /e/^etO T^e s&CJXi*-? t^ojr^ 
<r-F+r*-cft btj 7~£-e •Z-tStz /*r**irzjjL s 0 
t^-fC/^s-f 7 ^ ~S3&trc /£*/*•& 3 &7?Ts *?jr ••«?• 
jPesiSbt-e &/e~'£^JK>J &J&,m>^ ?r~ ^Jer-r- ^ « ^ * t ; 
hfS <?<7U ^Se-./ &Od> -&7leefl ?~ti m'/ S?sm * 
: ? ^ 0UU337 
3 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
prtcrvtcttcP /&?iT7*i£.st- ^ o -T£?S /ss^e C^^ J?-e 
&T- j2*^?70/e. f/z^pe^A TcScfi**s<*J? ^ 7&S. <&ud?f 
•es/**e>a./Jp X^ce 77- rj ^ ^ . e < ^ _ W * ? £ „ -
/-S /P-s'n^t- ^ ; ^ . i £ / S'»e-£i£.&r>'+'*4 « . . ' ' • • . 
^ 5 ^£> #f/9f.L#77£ Cc* KJS e-C 
/?/?fk/k?e f&t-^-eJj &*&****<. riC< / » < * ^ 5 ^ > u < 
Cte-U*^ U>AS *J>aT €>/£-^J /0y> .eAuC^ c^^^f 
&-£&*<T»<r*xxe ^ ^ ( . / , ePrtS^crT- <*/>/? *<? — •*->• 
7%*.<r 5 X* i^A 5 f+Je&ecr-i^e. & s • /Z*z t&cjP 
^ l u . / Q ^ ^ j . ^ T ^ V ^ / ? r . 
*' j?/te//&*•* <£*-»v--*^-/ s£-*v~/c/ A<z*<* CJ'Ssre-O 7-^>^7~ 
/SS*t-C cr^ A^sz c»^^j W 5 ^ / - V
 d / _ 0T**SZ_ 
/r?iST**ss »**•*< ^ ^ r v / o ^ ; ^ ^ usi*ir-
• S V ^ f*e<u><*:.U*/en~> '/*- Ttt Ur*>4 Z+y?«*^ C^r^^ 
/•y-^sZ f^,,'l^^f <TZ> c*v So e^jKi.s S9- m't s ^* r*? ^/h^.'-r-
CLKJ e/tsZarc X*7**~ /?& s C^^<rC~ £&;.* l*~~ A^ryZ^ 9 5vd» 
A^e5.s r v ^ ^ ^ £-s»~*r ^ 7 ^ ' ^ ^
 >-2> /?«^Jt*.s " 
Uja a A*/z /teiA^stAS jna> / s v ^ t ^ ^ &<r77*rui*ej 
C*t/I (?Ae-«L tC/Zcmrj Ji^sz A * / / f c C O ^ S ^ s ^ ^ 1 ^ 
J<e7T7)*%~- ^^-frni^a^-^J^c^^ d-T J^ey^j^J) 
/n^ste A-yi~e 7^-C Jzzr-t^/e s <*&*> S-esz-jn'e-^j T^e .-*->>£•£. 
A3e*T / ^ - d / ^ a o ^ flni+sT- /^yJyaS ^ c /ZirscrL-cJ3 
dc^5 sj>o-T SM0)/?CVLT- 7 7 ^
 / 4 - / ^ ^ « ^ ; ^ /HpJ^e^ 
7~t) J & - S~ - ^ t f ^
 x ^ 7 - JT><^ / W ^ / w , 4 ** .^ A-?-***- rj rj n n /•> Q 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ve*-b^T>l* •*«''* ^XT*****- -emor^^^J &s7u*-&*~-*c ^ 
wirt? -e^Tr-mu &#;£&«***- <z~n*^Jl^c£s a^P 
^/^^C^T^
 7 30 ^ ^ $£<™/j > w ^ i^^—» 
> £ / £ * * 7"? *>->' ^Zs&cS £)*. &jP/ie//<=iTe £<^ r-SrtZ f % J>J C< 
• . ?T .. c#c"-e s *tf/Z***z •-**-> c r Q /Ze&>&£> * 
7 ^ ST**^ ftla&^JK. A, £&*"''* 7% / C * 7 7 ^ « V < . 
/te/^s^cJ. fa c/i*/£**-?•* ^r£i 5 ^ * ^ p 5, ^o 
£*5-e 7-£c '*7&*j>s/iL+*-fJ!*r*s* . sruP~-T*zS Cxe-'&eT' cr/Z-
T& gPsfrv^er ^ c . . £**~/z*--. fj. /&sn-e;&s-&y 
jjp/te&sz s 0~r*-> cza^s r&'J"^? -
L-Cyoc-ii 
(ThJC-f1*5 J tr-^J ' 
C&eL&,-^ -y^iejj- h^7% -nz/kj? ^r~cP cZ/tyze /Ur< 
COivt^J S-& J -£i/Uc/ 
o--ervKs* s / *>& T^/J /Ss^-e /~s SA^^U^^J rn&e<n~T<~^ 
h^ 7 ^ L V ^ /2ej?#*e.cJP y^e SJT^^^ ^/zs$~0T^r*> *-5 
/T3 £i$2-<^ +rr>^^sr a<> t/l-^r* ^r^e (zS&sTm C y^e 
&£&J^r*u*> £L&*&r**J* *«s*s *S#CA&C fi**^^ 
5 c *>**7ns9ie*fr*-) ^^c£js7sU^£T && S^SL^?— S 5 su~£ 
/TO T^X-e 57W^Ljr V Q ^ R ^ L ^ 5 -?t*+j A* ^e fa* 
7~t> n^&c~ r^ w?/V< h^<ncjb~> *>O fifoe*3^* 
3
 000339 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
. &n*^£^ / &**4?mmj Tf-ttJ &-*•*-> s S S*t e Uj/n~&4> Ss 
O t>ij /i^Lj fnvei-^ 7€+ T&t&J? sZedmcO &^-c@ ^ &s^j? 
luAi~£'b tJr^** lefi /?<&**-£ /zesd*S-J?.cf /*SJ /&•&-&-*s**-~fi €»-*-* 
ap^tef'<^ / s?t<? er>/-<> <0&&*tn S's&^c£7<si£i£s <rS??*e$ 
' " ^ : 
-^ / 
7 % ^ ~ <?<*^ .J** J*k,a*r9, *•*•*/• j4&*^rn C^r-~^/j &cS*^J> \ 
•55**r< o . 7Z>~^7 *+>->, &5~& P9eP VA/Y^r*^ Sfy/?~S??&< 
dT^• ZffJirc V sYc /Zecrvtcfj £?*?% C<rj« r^%^/'s /&?A*^^S no 
^Ss^j^e&^^r^j s& Sir c**-r-r^T- 4^t c~j£*.'~^~S 
C*t ????.* Tfjsc C&e>fs S + Jr^> S^<r^9~*r**r. • > cZ&fj *~0 ~ 
&jyZ&9* &>^ ft* /Z&c^*L<D *T~**/Js*$z 5~Y*„ C ^ ^ : C ^ ^ 3 , 
ZST-JrS sr**sxrjG~r /r~ £?/lc^ h&S O '7*i<^~ ^Ye ^ ^ / / c r C 
&*7<7*-T~ i%3*v~/c/ g/ea*^ sir s+-' e^/^cr^Z-e o *J> ** &steeY£ t- Y 
7T l^J6;3 ^^/s^tYzrY^sz^ ^ ' 
/ fx^e r7£?-71*u^ *4**2_ J>Z*r>~>r"rK,#^ \S^**$ **^^~7~ S*?*sS<r~ 
Y&S/ T4V2 . A : V ^ . . . ^ Stees* T€^ £>+*a*£^> o Y 
p **>-<? r j r^At.^
 iKja <TW;3 tfA/sr ^p^J ^uU^c^C 
/ -£7-7 &*->-<?,£. C/^-^j J T r ^ K *t Cs-f&Zrr-* <TZ>^Z. SZ»<r f*~£j*\' 
/A-e s£ee#7<z.&f **<*ffl^/?j% ^^>^tn^f/c * jt^ef S^e~ ' 
cYeY^,^ //$7Z£j? /u> J6~S*-&€>£ ~3isj J<^$ *+-r 
&ttfj$/<j *— 5 a TZ-£*J /?&-t*~e ' & ^sn-rvTzz+jP s. r f/^-s ^/?/3J*i 
p^&iii*z^f~ -py L^-/£~s CJl?* /-: Q (jfwj
 m 
^r&^f'Ji^
 / t</n?~/* S 2^/3£ss>~<^ Ce^f/Z-iT^ J'o / w ^ ^ ^ r &- O* . 
C*» n n n o / n 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Qt>*~* sv» fi^cfffi fr"^ /f9r) in~*' 
*^P ce<~~ / * W 7 A*- / f~*f-.J<~y * * " » — ? 
5
 rtts ,ss^ o~ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ / e eT*^ 
"ZrfS *"'*) *-*****•"*} £"* "<~-">"""} f""*7 
i~a fA-r+i/ r&cT^ &*-*&*****• r>>~j 
/ ^ _ > S97C C "~<\ /?*•& ?*-* J " ^ \ 
PUt'~nJ& A*' "f *'* ^«<^ ***£**: ^CC' 
l,«f ^<-T AUS<^ ~A?Jk~,:r &rf**7 *o 
b*& /***->* h"~ ^ - " ~ ^ *y G7xt^+*A*~. 
7CAC£*±, ^ ~ ^ ~ * 7 OU^^^r /tfcn^ /kr/sj 
LTU^ lis.Zev') 0U0341 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
C ^ ^ ^ & t e t r t rJ <5^S2%sA 7 * C - f 
c £ l C*>^iT*/Z <£Z svna-JUe/ 
*%. <r* 
, 7 ^ gs/TZ^C. /9vTZ9**y, t**~e**tS V&Z-J- 2 ^ a ^ y , c ^ ^ 4 
& 
000342 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Addendum F 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
FILED 
APR 2 4 2009 
SECOND 
DISTRICT COURT 
IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT, DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
TROVON DONTA ROSS, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent. 
RULING ON PETITIONER'S MOTION 
TO APPOINT COUNSEL 
Case No. 080700641 
Judge Rodney S. Page 
COMES NOW the Court and having reviewed the petitioner's motion to appoint counsel 
and being fully advised in the premises rules as follows: 
BACKGROUND 
On October 24, 2004, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief and affidavit 
and application for waiver of court fees. Concurrent therewith, the petitioner filed a motion for 
appointment of counsel. Subsequently, on November 6, 2008, the Court reviewed the petitioner's 
affidavit and application for waiver of court fees and found the petitioner indigent and provided 
him with notice, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78A-2-306, of the initial partial filing fee 
associated with the filing of his petition. Thereafter, the petitioner paid the initial partial filing 
fee and submitted an amended statement of facts and memorandum in support of his petition. 
On April 9, 2009, and following the Court's preliminary review of the petition and 
supporting materials, pursuant to Rule 65C(g) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court 
issues an order of partial dismissal and requiring respondent's pleading. 
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On April 23, 2009, the petitioner renewed his request for appointment of counsel by 
filing the instant motion to appoint counsel. The petitioner's basis for the instant motion is the 
Court's order requiring the respondent's pleading. 
ANALYSIS 
The Utah Post-Conviction Remedies Act sets forth the rales that govern petitions for 
post-conviction relief. See Utah Code Ann. §78B-9-101 et seq.;see also Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(a). 
Specifically, Utah Code Ann. §78B-9-109 establishes when pro bono counsel maybe appointed 
in post-conviction matters, to wit: 
"If any portion of the petition is not summarily dismissed, the court may, 
upon the request of an indigent petitioner, appoint counsel on a pro bono 
basis to represent the petitioner in the post-conviction court or on post-
conviction appeal." 
Utah Code Ann. §78B-9-109(l) (Emphasis added); see also State v. Ford, 199 P.3d 892, 896 
(Utah 2008). "The Act indicates such appointment should occur at the request of the petitioner, 
and where an evidentiaiy hearing would be required or the petition involves complicated issues 
of law or fact that require the assistance of counsel for proper adjudication" Ford, 199 P.3d at 
896 (Emphasis added) (Internal quotations omitted); see also Utah Code Ann. §786-9-109(2). 
In the instant matter, as the respondent has not yet submitted a responsive pleading that 
addresses the petitioner's surviving claims, the Court has not determined whether an evidentiary 
hearing is necessary. Further, the Court summarily dismissed the majority of the petitioner's 
claims without reviewing the merits of the petitioner's surviving claims; thus, the complexity of 
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the petitioner's remaining claims and the need for the appointment of counsel for the proper 
adjudication of such claims is uncertain at this time. 
Accordingly, at this point in the proceedings, the Court finds the petitioner's motion to 
appoint counsel premature.1 The Court therefore DENIES the petitioner's motion to appoint 
counsel. 
CONCLUSION 
For the aforementioned reasons, the Court DENIES the petitioner's motion to appoint 
counsel. However, the Court grants the petitioner leave to renew his motion to appoint counsel at 
the proper time in the proceedings. This ruling shall also constitute the Court's order in this 
matter; no separate order is required. 
Date signed: ( f y u J l ^ M j £001 
UyrxQouuL^ J>6 . r*} •AJUA 
DISTRICT"C0URT JUDGE 




 This is not to say that at some later point in the proceedings the Court would be unwilling to order the appointment 
of pro bono counsel. The petitioner may certainly renew his motion to appoint counsel at a more appropriate time, 
such as, if and when the Court determines that an evidentiary hearing on his petition for post-conviction relief is 
necessary following the submission of the respondent's pleading. 
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